Anesthetic Control of 40-Hz Brain Activity and Implicit Memory

Schwender, D.; Madler, C.; Klasing, S.; Peter, K.; Pöppel, Ernst

doi:10.1006/ccog.1994.1009

Cited by 39 publications

(22 citation statements)

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“…Thus, high-frequency components of sensory evoked potentials, which indicate precise neuronal synchronization when recorded in the awake state, have been shown to disappear under deep anesthesia (Schwender et al 1994; note that under such conditions the neurons are-in terms of their average firing rate-still responding well to sensory stimuli). Furthermore, EEG measurements have provided clear evidence that synchronization in the gamma band is enhanced during arousal and during focused attention (Sheer 1989, Desmedt andTomberg 1994).…”

Section: Relation To Arousal and Attentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Temporal Binding, Binocular Rivalry, and Consciousness

Engel

Fries

König

et al. 1999

Consciousness and Cognition

304

170

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Section: Relation To Arousal and Attentionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Temporal Binding, Binocular Rivalry, and Consciousness

Engel

Fries

König

et al. 1999

Consciousness and Cognition

304

170

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“…General anesthesia, on the other hand, attenuates the high-frequency components of sensory evoked potentials without significantly altering the average firing rates of sensory cortical neurons (Schwender, Madler, Klasing, Peter, & Pöppel, 1994). Direct electrical stimulation of the midbrain reticular formation causes an increase in visually evoked synchronization in the visual cortex (Munk et al, 1996).…”

Section: Positive Features and Potential Drawbacks Of The Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Possibility of Universal Neural Coding of Subjective Experience

Helekar

1999

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…Only if these oscillations disappear can one be sure one has sufficient anesthesia (Madler & Pöppel 1987). If under anesthesia such oscillations are preserved, sensory information can still be processed (Schwender et al 1994). Patients who have undergone anesthesia in which the oscillatory activities are completely suppressed often report spontaneously that no time at all has elapsed while in the anesthetic state (statements may be: "nothing has happened"; "when does the operation start?…”

Section: Ernst Pöppelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Types of anesthesia that do not suppress the oscillations promote implicit recall of tapes played under anesthesia. (Patients exposed to a recording of a Robinson Crusoe story are much more likely to associate Crusoe with "Friday" after the operation; see Schwender et al 1994). Pöppel mentions another interesting temporal matter: evidence for mechanisms of presemantic automatic sensory integration that take 2-3 seconds.…”

Section: R9 P ϭ A?mentioning

confidence: 99%

P-Consciousness presentation/A-Consciousness representation

Gamble¹

1997

Behav Brain Sci

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of the original article: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses."Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct "guesses." They cannot harness this information in the service of action, however, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field are both access-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of access-consciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness. An example of access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness?Joseph E. BogenDepartment of Neurological Surgery, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90033-4620.Abstract: Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a "zombie," computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?Block (1995a) makes a clear conceptual distinction between what he calls phenomenal consciousness (P) and what he calls access consciousness (A). The former (P) he points to by saying that "P-conscious states are experiential"; he gives examples such as smells, tastes, pains, thoughts, and desires (p. 230). The latter (A) he describes as a state in which some content is "poised for use as a premise in reasoning" and "poised for rational control of action" (p. 231). A can also be "poised for rational control of speech," but for Block this is not a necessary aspect because he considers chimps to have A. Indeed, he elsewhere notes that "very much lower animals are A-conscious" (p. 238). Block is at some pains to consider the possibilities of P without A and of A without P; in particular, he says, "It certainly seems conceptually possible that the neural bases of P-consciousness systems and A-consciousness systems are distinct" (p. 233). Block provides some possible examples of P without A (on p. 234 and p. 244) such as "becoming conscious" (acquiring A) of an ongoing noise (e.g., a pneumatic drill) some considerable time after one has been "aware of " or has been "experiencing" it. Although Block is reluctant to accept dreaming as an example of P without A (p. 275), some of us are inclined to a...

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Anesthetic Control of 40-Hz Brain Activity and Implicit Memory

Cited by 39 publications

References 0 publications

Temporal Binding, Binocular Rivalry, and Consciousness

Temporal Binding, Binocular Rivalry, and Consciousness

On the Possibility of Universal Neural Coding of Subjective Experience

P-Consciousness presentation/A-Consciousness representation

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