Anti-luck epistemology

Pritchard, Duncan

doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9039-7

Cited by 250 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…While I argue against this as an adequate view of the metaphysics of luck in McKinnon , my focus here is different. Starting with Mylan Engel (), and further developed by Pritchard (, , and elsewhere), philosophers have distinguished between veritic and evidential luck. In the epistemic domain, these concern how a true belief is formed.…”

Section: “Intervening” and “Environmental” Luckmentioning

confidence: 99%

You Make Your Own Luck

McKinnon

2014

Metaphilosophy

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This essay takes up two questions. First, what does it mean to say that someone creates her own luck? At least colloquially speaking, luck is conceived as something out of an agent's control. So how could an agent increase or decrease the likelihood that she'll be lucky? Building on some recent work on the metaphysics of luck, the essay argues that there is a sense in which agents can create their own luck because people with more skill tend to have more opportunities to benefit from luck. Second, what implications does this conception of luck have for related topics such as how we evaluate performances (like shooting an arrow), including coming to know something? The ubiquitous presence of luck in our actions is often underappreciated. The essay argues that when we combine an expected outcomes view of luck with a counterfactual view of causation, the distinction between environmental and intervening veritic luck seems to disappear. We need a more nuanced view of how luck sometimes undermines credit for success in agents' actions. The upshot of this view is that while luck may undermine the creditworthiness of an agent's success, it only partially undermines creditworthiness.

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Section: “Intervening” and “Environmental” Luckmentioning

confidence: 99%

You Make Your Own Luck

McKinnon

2014

Metaphilosophy

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“…When an agent is in a position to know that p, all the ingredients for knowledge are in place, apart from belief. Hence the following version, 6 This definition of luck is similar to what Pritchard terms reflective epistemic luck, as opposed to veritic epistemic luck (Pritchard 2005(Pritchard , 2007. On Pritchard's construal, a true belief may qualify as knowledge as long as there in fact is no wide class of nearby possible worlds in which the belief is false, holding the relevant initial conditions constant.…”

Section: Luck As An Epistemic Notionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a prominent recent version of the luck program, seePritchard (2005Pritchard ( , 2007.A. Steglich-Petersen (B) University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark e-mail: filasp@hum.au.dk…”

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Luck as an epistemic notion

Steglich‐Petersen

2009

Synthese

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Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent's epistemic situation. According to the proposed account, an event is lucky for an agent only if the agent was not in a position to know that the event would occur. It is also explored whether this new account threatens the anti-luck program in epistemology. It is argued that although not detrimental to the anti-luck program, the epistemic account of luck sets certain important limits to its scope and feasibility.

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“…Moreover, I claim that anti‐luck epistemology has predictive power, as it enables us to adjudicate, in a principled fashion, between opposing responses to certain cases, in that it can highlight which details of the case are important and thereby explain why two superficially identical formulations of a given example can generate very different responses. For more on anti‐luck epistemology, see Pritchard ; ; ; and . See also Pritchard ; ; ; ; forthcoming a ; and forthcoming c .…”

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The Modal Account of Luck

Pritchard

2014

Metaphilosophy

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This essay offers a rearticulation and defence of the modal account of luck that the author developed in earlier work (e.g., Pritchard 2005). In particular, the proposal is situated within a certain methodology, a component of which is paying due attention to the cognitive science literature on luck (and risk) ascriptions. It is shown that with the modal account of luck properly articulated it can adequately deal with some of the problems that have recently been offered against it, and that the view has a number of attractions over competing proposals, such as the lack of control account.

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Anti-luck epistemology

Cited by 250 publications

References 39 publications

You Make Your Own Luck

You Make Your Own Luck

Luck as an epistemic notion

The Modal Account of Luck

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