Anti-Partism and Party Control of Political Reform in the United States: The Case of the Australian Ballot

Abstract

This article examines critically an explanation, first propounded by Austin Ranney, as to the causes of party reform in the United States. Ranney argued that there is an ambivalent attitude to parties in the United States; while there is evidence of popular support for parties, the political culture is also infused by anti-party values. Periodically this has facilitated the enactment of legislation, promoted by anti-party reformers, constraining parties. Focusing on the Australian Ballot, the article argues that its rapid adoption in the United States resulted from its seeming to solve problems facing party elites in the 1880s – problems that arose from the erosion of a face-to-face society. Despite opposition from anti-party reformers, parties in most states legislated for types of ballot that preserved party control of the electorate. Moreover, during the Progressive era the parties generally continued to preserve a type of ballot that favoured them. The ability of parties to defend their interests against anti-party reformers was possible when it was clear where those interests lay. With other reforms, including the direct primary, this was much less evident, and it was then far more difficult for the parties to defend themselves.

Reevaluating the Vote Market Hypothesis: Effects of Australian Ballot Reform on Voter Turnout

“…Despite the potential effect of these new reforms on voter payment, it is possible that the stability of the vote market and the guarantee of voter compliance had always been somewhat uncertain for the party bosses. Splitting tickets had actually been quite common before the passage of secret ballots through the use of “pasters,” “knifing,” and “scratching” of names from printed ballots (Bensel 2004a; Reynolds and McCormick 1986; Ware 2000). Cox and Kousser (1981) note that voter payments may have continued to occur well after the passage of the Australian ballot in many states, although in the form of “deflationary” rather than inflationary incentives.…”

Reconciling Legal-Institutional and Behavioral Perspectives on Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence from Pennsylvania, 1876–1948

“…Crucially, such a transformation took place quite apart from the legal changes that were going on in the realm of additional restrictions on the franchise (to include new, personal voter registration requirements) and ballot reforms that were instituted in an effort to break the grip of the parties on the electoral process (see Engstrom and Kernell 2005;Ware 2000). On this point, it is worth quoting Burnham (1970, 76) at some length:…”

“…However, when the parties folded up their news operations, they effectively ceded control of one important component of their mobilization operation-"communications 'sinews of war'" that were part of "an elaborate, well-staffed, and strongly motivated organizational structure" (Burnham 1970, 72). It was likely only as the parties shifted away from a strategy of mobilization, as described by Richard Jensen (1971), and toward a more persuasion-based strategy, that voter registration requirements would begin to exact their toll on civic life in America (see also Ware 2000).…”

Ballots, Transparency, and Democracy

“…Political corruption at the time included such practices as the payment of voters, candidates required to compensate party leaders in order to have their names placed on lists of prefened candidates, and stuffing ballot boxes with votes by nonexistent voters (Schaffer 2002;Ware 2000). As Bensel (2004) notes, ballots in the 1800s were not printed by election officials or the government but were constructed by the political parties.…”

“…Athough the received wisdom is that the adoption of the secret ballot was motivated by an effort to curb political corruption, there is an alternative perspective that argues that there might have been a secondary motive to the rapid adoption of ballot reforms: established party officials sought the use of secret ballots as a means of disenfranchising likely supporters of opposition parties and suppressing their votes (Kousser 1974;Walker 2005;Ware 2000, Lowenstein et al 2012. Decreases in voter turnout that resulted from the introduction of these reforms is pointed to as evidence to confirm the "strategic disenfranchisement" hypothesis.…”