This book rejects conventional accounts of how American political parties differ from those in other democracies. It focuses on the introduction of the direct primary and argues that primaries resulted from a process of party institutionalization initiated by party elites. It overturns the widely accepted view that, between 1902 and 1915, direct primaries were imposed on the parties by anti-party reformers intent on weakening them. An examination of particular northern states shows that often the direct primary was not controversial, and only occasionally did it involve confrontation between party 'regulars' and their opponents. Rather, the impetus for direct nominations came from attempts within the parties to subject informal procedures to formal rules. However, it proved impossible to reform the older caucus-convention system effectively, and party elites then turned to the direct primary - a device that already had become more common in rural counties in the late nineteenth century.

A small, but apparently expanding, area of research in the United States has developed around the issue of whether divisive primary elections harm the general election prospects of the winners of such primaries. The subject matter is important, being of interest to students of intra-party democracy, party organization and voting behaviour. Unfortunately the research reported in major American political science journals has been directed, with one exception, towards a trivial question, at the expense of the more complex and interesting ones. The purpose of this Note is to explain why this question is not even a poor substitute for them, and to suggest the problems towards which research in this area should be directed.

This article examines critically an explanation, first propounded by Austin Ranney, as to the causes of party reform in the United States. Ranney argued that there is an ambivalent attitude to parties in the United States; while there is evidence of popular support for parties, the political culture is also infused by anti-party values. Periodically this has facilitated the enactment of legislation, promoted by anti-party reformers, constraining parties. Focusing on the Australian Ballot, the article argues that its rapid adoption in the United States resulted from its seeming to solve problems facing party elites in the 1880s – problems that arose from the erosion of a face-to-face society. Despite opposition from anti-party reformers, parties in most states legislated for types of ballot that preserved party control of the electorate. Moreover, during the Progressive era the parties generally continued to preserve a type of ballot that favoured them. The ability of parties to defend their interests against anti-party reformers was possible when it was clear where those interests lay. With other reforms, including the direct primary, this was much less evident, and it was then far more difficult for the parties to defend themselves.

This article examines how party organization affects, and is itself affected by, the objectives pursued by parties in liberal democracies; it focuses on vote-seeking behaviour by parties. It argues that it is a mistake to model activist-leader relations in the past as having been primarily the product of particular kinds of 'exchanges' between leaders and activists in a party. Such models limit our understanding of intra-party relations in four important respects -by focusing exclusively on the idea of 'exchange' and not examining the role of 'gifts'; by not considering the role of solidary incentives; by omitting an analysis of loyalty; and by not taking account of the role of habit. However, the article also argues that 'exchange' is becoming now a far more significant element in intra-party relations and that this development will constrain party leaders and influence the goals pursued by parties. Greater reliance on exchange between leaders and activists may lead to parties becoming generally more policyseeking in their behaviour and also to their becoming less manageable than in the past.

This 2006 book examines the dynamics of the American party system and explores how contemporary American politics was formed. Specifically, it asks how the Democrats could become sufficiently competitive in the American North as to be able to construct a national political majority. It rejects the conventional account, based on 'realignment theory', that between the end of Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Revolution, the base level of support for the Democratic party varied greatly from one era to another. Instead, by distinguishing between the 'building blocks' available to the Democrats in coalition formation and the aggregation of those 'blocks' into an actual coalition, the author shows that there was much less variation over time in the available 'blocks' than is usually argued. Neither the economic depression of 1893 nor the New Deal had the impact on the party system that most political scientists claim.