Abstract:This book rejects conventional accounts of how American political parties differ from those in other democracies. It focuses on the introduction of the direct primary and argues that primaries resulted from a process of party institutionalization initiated by party elites. It overturns the widely accepted view that, between 1902 and 1915, direct primaries were imposed on the parties by anti-party reformers intent on weakening them. An examination of particular northern states shows that often the direct primar… Show more
“…Changes to the electoral system in Australia (Farrell and McAllister 2005), British Columbia (Angus 1952), and New Zealand (Banducci and Karp 1999) have been documented in terms of strategic elites seeking partisan advantage (also see Bawn 1993 on Germany). Mass and elite support for election reform proposals in the United States such as legislative term limits (Karp 1995), changes in redistricting rules (Donovan 2011), primary election rules (Cain and Gerber 2001;Ware 2002), and direct election of the president (Karp and Tolbert 2010) can also be understood through strategic calculations of partisans. In many of these cases, the attitudes of partisans in the public can be seen as reflecting the positions of party elites.…”
Section: A Partisan Model Of Election Reformmentioning
We propose a model of public response to politicized election reform. In this model, rival partisan elites send signals on the need and consequences of a proposed reform, with partisans in public adopting those positions. We apply this to test how state use of voter identification laws corresponded with public evaluations of the conduct of a state's elections. We find that the relationship between photo identification laws and confidence in state elections was polarized and conditioned by party identification in 2014. Democrats in states with strict photo identification laws were less confident in their state's elections. Republicans in states with strict identification laws were more confident than others. Results suggest strict photo identification laws are failing to instill broad-based confidence in elections, and that the reform could correspond with diminished confidence among some.
“…Changes to the electoral system in Australia (Farrell and McAllister 2005), British Columbia (Angus 1952), and New Zealand (Banducci and Karp 1999) have been documented in terms of strategic elites seeking partisan advantage (also see Bawn 1993 on Germany). Mass and elite support for election reform proposals in the United States such as legislative term limits (Karp 1995), changes in redistricting rules (Donovan 2011), primary election rules (Cain and Gerber 2001;Ware 2002), and direct election of the president (Karp and Tolbert 2010) can also be understood through strategic calculations of partisans. In many of these cases, the attitudes of partisans in the public can be seen as reflecting the positions of party elites.…”
Section: A Partisan Model Of Election Reformmentioning
We propose a model of public response to politicized election reform. In this model, rival partisan elites send signals on the need and consequences of a proposed reform, with partisans in public adopting those positions. We apply this to test how state use of voter identification laws corresponded with public evaluations of the conduct of a state's elections. We find that the relationship between photo identification laws and confidence in state elections was polarized and conditioned by party identification in 2014. Democrats in states with strict photo identification laws were less confident in their state's elections. Republicans in states with strict identification laws were more confident than others. Results suggest strict photo identification laws are failing to instill broad-based confidence in elections, and that the reform could correspond with diminished confidence among some.
“…The direct primary was touted by early 20th century Progressive reformers as a way to remove party officials from the selection of nominees, yet party insiders managed to dominate these contests with relative ease (Ware 2002). Reforms to the presidential nominating system in the late 1960s briefly allowed for the nomination of outsiders, but by the 1980s, party elites had developed methods of dominating this system (Cohen et al 2008).…”
Political parties are not static organizations; they continually adapt to changes to the political, electoral, and legal environments. In this paper we argue that so-called 527 committees are another form of party adaptation. We investigate questions about their role in elections, using a dataset consisting of the personnel backgrounds of the largest 527s in the 2004 and 2006 election cycles. We examine the staffing of these groups and their ties to the formal party structures. We find that 527 organizations with stronger personnel links to formal party organizations have more connections to other 527s. The results suggest that 527s are not independent actors disrupting the party system, but rather well-placed participants in the party networks that helped parties adapt to a changing electoral context.
“…The strong party machines of old have been eroded to a large extent as a consequence of their losing control over their personnel running for public office. This was due to the introduction of the direct primary (Ware, 2002). But even where parties are stronger, patterns differ.…”
Section: The Structure Of Political Organizationsmentioning
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