Antitrust, the Internet, and the Economics of Networks

Spulber, Daniel F.; Yoo, Christopher S.

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199859191.013.0017

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…From an economic perspective, we can think about algorithmic pluralism in terms of the degree of competition in the market for algorithmic agents. The standard tools of antitrust policy will be useful (Viscusi et al, 2018), although the specifics of digital markets (Spulber & Yoo, 2013) and algorithms (Portuese, 2022) raise their own issues for competition economics and policy. The practical challenge of ensuring competition is likely to be significant, but familiar analytic tools and policy instruments are available.…”

Section: Institutions Facilitating Choice Among Algorithmic Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Algorithmic Decision-Making, Agency Costs, and Institution-Based Trust

Dowding,

Taylor

2024

Philos. Technol.

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Algorithm Decision Making (ADM) systems designed to augment or automate human decision-making have the potential to produce better decisions while also freeing up human time and attention for other pursuits. For this potential to be realised, however, algorithmic decisions must be sufficiently aligned with human goals and interests. We take a Principal-Agent (P-A) approach to the questions of ADM alignment and trust. In a broad sense, ADM is beneficial if and only if human principals can trust algorithmic agents to act faithfully on their behalf. This mirrors the challenge of facilitating P-A relationships among humans, but the peculiar nature of human-machine interaction also raises unique issues. The problem of asymmetric information is omnipresent but takes a different form in the context of ADM. Although the decision-making machinery of an algorithmic agent can in principle be laid bare for all to see, the sheer complexity of ADM systems based on deep learning models prevents straightforward monitoring. We draw on literature from economics and political science to argue that the problem of trust in ADM systems should be addressed at the level of institutions. Although the dyadic relationship between human principals and algorithmic agents is our ultimate concern, cooperation at this level must rest against an institutional environment which allows humans to effectively evaluate and choose among algorithmic alternatives.

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Section: Institutions Facilitating Choice Among Algorithmic Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Algorithmic Decision-Making, Agency Costs, and Institution-Based Trust

Dowding,

Taylor

2024

Philos. Technol.

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“…Cambini and Jiang (2009), for example, remark that B [t]he tension between promoting competition and promoting investment has been noted widely in the telecommunications economics literature.Ŝ ince the industry had long been recognized by the mainstream as an example of a market with natural monopoly characteristics, the opportunity for competition was initially sought only in some parts of telecommunications, while others remained under the control of incumbents (Yoo 2011). Meanwhile, Spulber and Yoo (2013) point out that there has not been agreement among empirical scholars about subadditivity of local telephone services. Faulhaber (2003) complains that Bthe Bnatural monopoly^thesis … was never actually put to a market test,^and some scholars even claim the mainstream declaration Bthat free-market competition was the source of the telephone monopoly in the early twentieth century is the biggest lie ever told by the economics profession^ (DiLorenzo 1996).…”

Section: Bcompetitive Order^vs Bordered Competitionî N Telecommunicamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, this position can be challenged by the main assumptions of the contestable market theory, which claims that even those markets that have a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure might provide the same outcome as competitive markets (Baumol et al 1982). Spulber and Yoo (2013), for example, notice that B[t]echnological change ... has made telecommunications markets contestable by reducing the sunk costs associated with market entry.^Pluralization of the field makes the costs of entering into neighboring territories even lower, and, thereby, creates an environment where overlapping of neighboring networks is feasible. If the network structure is represented by a number of independent networks, these local monopolies can be destroyed by the real market process.…”

Section: Evolution Of the Order Of The Russian Telecommunications Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

The Russian Telecommunications Experience: a Positive Outcome of the Competitive Order in the Industry

Trubnikov

2019

J Ind Compet Trade

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The assumption that the telecommunications industry has natural monopoly characteristics dominated industrial policy during the twentieth century, supporting the monopolistic structure of telecommunications markets all across the world, and still prevails in many views on the economy of this field. The high level of concentration of telecommunications markets is often considered as a natural way of its development and some claim that this is a necessary condition for innovations in the industry. Meanwhile, the evolution of telecommunications in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union has shown quite the opposite. The industry in the country was able to demonstrate a relatively low level of market concentration, at least in some of the areas, to provide a high quality and a large variety of telecommunications services at significantly lower prices, in comparison with western countries, and shows one of the best indicators of network development in the world. While the Russian case poses quandaries for mainstream theories, the phenomenon fits the view of the Austrian school at the market process and exposes the benefits that the competitive order can bring to society.

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“…A free‐market environment is, according to policymakers, an environment which is susceptible to what orthodox thinking sees as ‘market failure’ . At the same time, a totally opposite outlook has also been presented in the academic literature, according to which telecoms markets “seem fully capable of resolving most of the potential market failures” (Spulber & Yoo, , p. 16), while inadequate understanding of the competitive process leads regulators to over‐regulate (Littlechild, ). Moreover, another view examines the private interests which shape regulation in light of the needs of particular interest groups (see, e.g., Abbott & Brady, ; McChesney, ; Brady, ; Trubnikov, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of ‘ordered competition’ in European telecoms

Trubnikov

Трубникова

2019

Economic Affairs

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This article discusses the current efforts of policymakers to spur development of telecommunications infrastructure. It argues that the policy of ‘ordered competition’, widely implemented in this sector, has formed a highly beneficial environment for major players, who have the ability to influence the regulatory machine. The system protects the status quo, impedes the efficiency of the market process and allows unnecessary public subsidy of the industry's development. The main alternative to this regulatory regime is structural reform of the industry and the formation of a genuinely competitive marketplace which could function without ex ante regulation.

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Antitrust, the Internet, and the Economics of Networks

Cited by 6 publications

References 54 publications

Algorithmic Decision-Making, Agency Costs, and Institution-Based Trust

Algorithmic Decision-Making, Agency Costs, and Institution-Based Trust

The Russian Telecommunications Experience: a Positive Outcome of the Competitive Order in the Industry

The political economy of ‘ordered competition’ in European telecoms

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