The Russian Telecommunications Experience: a Positive Outcome of the Competitive Order in the Industry

Abstract

The assumption that the telecommunications industry has natural monopoly characteristics dominated industrial policy during the twentieth century, supporting the monopolistic structure of telecommunications markets all across the world, and still prevails in many views on the economy of this field. The high level of concentration of telecommunications markets is often considered as a natural way of its development and some claim that this is a necessary condition for innovations in the industry. Meanwhile, the evolution of telecommunications in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union has shown quite the opposite. The industry in the country was able to demonstrate a relatively low level of market concentration, at least in some of the areas, to provide a high quality and a large variety of telecommunications services at significantly lower prices, in comparison with western countries, and shows one of the best indicators of network development in the world. While the Russian case poses quandaries for mainstream theories, the phenomenon fits the view of the Austrian school at the market process and exposes the benefits that the competitive order can bring to society.

Technological innovation and competitive advantage in telecommunication companies in Kenya

“…Theories of innovations and technological advancement focus on key issues that help firms stay ahead of the competition. In many cases, for industrialists, those technological innovations that impact both production and performance require protection by industry leaders and government regulators for fair competition (Trubnikov, 2020). Several scholars, including Dachs et al (2017), allude to the disruptive innovation theory as the mainstay for innovations on the basis of forced adaptations that firms must undergo, lest they face dethronement from their industry standing.…”

“…For the past decade, various innovative technologies have helped telecommunication companies to change lives under the Viable Development Objectives initiatives, which include education, health, and agribusiness apps. The applications have enhanced the efficiency and speed of delivering these services (Trubnikov, 2020).…”

The political economy of ‘ordered competition’ in European telecoms

“…Construction of fibre optic lines is significantly cheaper than construction of copper lines, and this is the main explanation of why technologies based on the implementation of fibre have become dominant in the telecommunications markets of the less advanced economies of eastern Europe . The possibility of aerial deployment of the infrastructure provided newcomers with the opportunity to operate independently from the networks capacity of their main rivals, and this independence, not the areal wiring per se, was the main factor that facilitated the development of the fibre optic networks (Trubnikov, ).…”

Deregulation of European Telecommunications: The Role of Private Interests

“…Ни одна из этих теорий не обращает внимания на то, что европейское регулирование запрещало конкуренцию в сфере телефонной связи и независимое развитие телекоммуникационной инфраструктуры вплоть до конца 1990-х годов, тогда как в России к этому времени уже функционировало около 2700 независимых телефонных компаний в дополнение к 92 наследницам советской монополии 17 . Результатом именно такой спонтанной организации отрасли, которая открыто ставила под вопрос мо-дели, представленные в ортодоксальной литературе [Laffont, Tirole, 2000], явилось европейское лидерство в развитии инноваций в телекоммуникационном секторе и доступности услуг для потребителей в 2000-х [Trubnikov, 2019]. Этот феномен даже отмечался Стиглицем как «затруднительное положение для традиционных экономических теорий» [Stiglitz, 1999.…”

“…P. 6]. История развития телекоммуникаций в России в конце 1990-х и начале 2000-х годов открыто свидетельствует в пользу теорий австрийской школы и в то же время наглядно демонстрирует, что основные реформы эпохи дерегулирования базировались на частных интересах тех, кто имел доступ к установлению новых регуляторных норм [Trubnikov, 2019].…”