Apples, oranges and hosting providers: Heterogeneity and security in the hosting market

Tajalizadehkhoob, Samaneh; Korczyński, Maciej; Noroozian, Arman; Gañán, Carlos; Eeten, Michel van

doi:10.1109/noms.2016.7502824

Cited by 19 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Somewhat analogous to our work on ISPS, we have mapped the global markets for hosting providers, which consists of around 45,000 firms (Tajalizadehkhoob et al, 2016). We leveraged a variety of data sources on compromised servers in that market to build comparative metrics for compromise rates at providers (Noroozian et al, 2015(Noroozian et al, , 2017.…”

Section: Mitigating Web Compromisementioning

confidence: 99%

Patching security governance: an empirical view of emergent governance mechanisms for cybersecurity

Eeten

2017

DPRG

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If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.

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Section: Mitigating Web Compromisementioning

confidence: 99%

Patching security governance: an empirical view of emergent governance mechanisms for cybersecurity

Eeten

2017

DPRG

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“…To identify shared hosts, we use the methodology some of us introduced in [29], in which an IP address is classified as shared hosting if it hosts more than 10 unique domain names.…”

Section: Web Hostingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In short, for each IP address, we retrieve the organization that this IP is assigned to (or is "allocated" to), using their respective RIR IP whois data and historical Maxmind Geo-IP2 database [26]. We then use the methodology and keywords described in our previous work [29] to classify the organizations according to their business plans: hosting providers, content delivery networks (CDNs), educational, among others.…”

Section: Organizations Mapping and Classificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this section, we classify these organizations according to their types ( §3.3, [29]). We group organizations into government related, educational, domain parking, hosting providers, ISPs, CDNs, DDoS-protection services and others.…”

Section: Types Of Organizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We classify the IP addresses from the hosting organizations listed in §4.4 into shared and non-shared hosting via the methodology explained earlier in §2.2 [29]. Figure 7 is a histogram of relative market share within the hosting segment, split between shared and non-shared hosting services.…”

Section: Types Of Hosting: Shared and Non-sharedmentioning

confidence: 99%

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No domain left behind

Aertsen

Korczyński

Moura

et al. 2017

Proceedings of the Applied Networking Research Workshop

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The 2013 National Security Agency revelations of pervasive monitoring have lead to an "encryption rush" across the computer and Internet industry. To push back against massive surveillance and protect users privacy, vendors, hosting and cloud providers have widely deployed encryption on their hardware, communication links, and applications. As a consequence, the most of web traffic nowadays is encrypted. However, there is still a significant part of Internet traffic that is not encrypted. It has been argued that both costs and complexity associated with obtaining and deploying X.509 certificates are major barriers for widespread encryption, since these certificates are required to established encrypted connections. To address these issues, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Mozilla Foundation, and the University of Michigan have set up Let's Encrypt (LE ), a certificate authority that provides both free X.509 certificates and software that automates the deployment of these certificates. In this paper, we investigate if LE has been successful in democratizing encryption: we analyze certificate issuance in the first year of LE and show from various perspectives that LE adoption has an upward trend and it is in fact being successful in covering the lower-cost end of the hosting market.

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