Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues

Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen; Sgobbi, Alessandra

doi:10.2139/ssrn.722362

Cited by 23 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…This result of the simulation exercise is in line with both the theoretical findings of non-cooperative bargaining theory and the applications of non-cooperative bargaining models to water negotiations (see Carraro et al, 2005, andCarraro et al, 2007). Furthermore, more iterations are needed before a limit point equilibrium solution is found, indicating the increased difficulties in finding a compromise allocation.…”

Section: Sensitivity Analysissupporting

confidence: 80%

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Carraro¹,

Sgobbi²

2007

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process -asymmetries and uncertainties in particular -by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players' optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on players' strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects players' behaviour and modifies the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite size are increasing. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Sensitivity Analysissupporting

confidence: 80%

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Carraro¹,

Sgobbi²

2007

SSRN Journal

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“…This undermines its credibility of actually going to punish in case of noncompliance. A lack of credibility of punishment strategies can obstruct the effective use of punishment strategies in international agreements on water allocation (Carraro et al 2005). The examples in Sect.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

Ansink

Ruijs

2008

Environ Resource Econ

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We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper we assess the stability of water allocation agreements using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that a decrease in mean river flow decreases the stability of an agreement, while an increased variance can have a positive or a negative effect on stability. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules. These results hold for both constant and flexible non-water transfers.

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“…Other studies emphasize the potential for water markets to play a useful role in resolving international water disputes [e.g., Dinar and Wolf, 1994;Easter et al, 1999;Perry et al, 1997;World Water Commission, 2000;Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2005]. Finally, a few theoretical studies address general allocation issues from a game theoretic perspective [e.g., Rogers, 1997;Ambec and Sprumont, 2002;Just and Netanyahu, 2004;Carraro et al, 2005;Wu and Whittington, 2006;Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos, 2008]. Dinar et al [2007] develop an integrated approach to the study of conflict over transboundary international water resources, applying theory from international relations, economics, and international law, as well as the quantitative tools of river basin modeling and game theory.…”

Section: Related Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dividing the waters: An empirical analysis of interstate compact allocation of transboundary rivers

Katz

2011

Water Resources Research

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[1] Legal scholars and jurists have identified several criteria (e.g., hydrology, climate, population, and historical water use) to guide equitable allocation of transboundary rivers among riparian claimants. Are these criteria used in practice, such that a quantitative pattern emerges from actual water-sharing agreements regarding factors affecting allocations? To address this, we study interstate compacts, the principal mechanism for allocating the waters of transboundary rivers within the United States. We develop a georeferenced data set and construct variables representing conditions in state-based watersheds of 14 rivers at the times of compact ratification. A state's water allocation share of a compact serves as the dependent variable, and a set of explanatory variables is derived from legal and political theories. We estimate allocation shares using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and bootstrap regressions, and we apply two alternative specifications of the factors affecting compact allocations, one with and one without political variables. Estimated coefficients on variables for land area, population, prior water use, riparian position, and Congressional committee chair are statistically significant in the OLS regressions. The preferred OLS specification, which includes political variables, provides a good fit (R 2 = 0.84). We also find that OLS and bootstrap regressions have a similar ability to predict state allocation shares. We discuss how the results could be used as a reference point in negotiations over new compacts or international river treaties and as a basis to identify existing compacts with statistical outliers.

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Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues

Cited by 23 publications

References 63 publications

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

Dividing the waters: An empirical analysis of interstate compact allocation of transboundary rivers

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