Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture, 1960-1967

Levite, Ariel; Landau, Emily B.

doi:10.2979/isr.1996.1.1.34

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…More importantly, a 1994 study by Ariel Levite and Emily Landau suggested that Arab leaders had been convinced since the 1970s that Israel possessed nuclear military capabilities. 89 At present, it is widely believed that Israel deploys nuclear capabilities on land, in the air, and at sea. As of early 2016, the Israeli strategic submarine fleet counts five modern vessels, and a sixth one is scheduled to either join or replace the older of the five, within two years.…”

Section: Assessing the Existential Nuclear Threat: The Strategic Contmentioning

confidence: 99%

Israeli Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threat

Merom¹

2017

Political Science Quarterly

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ISRAELI DECISION MAKERS HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY attentive to the Iranian nuclear threat since the 1990s. 1 They have debated extensively the threat of nuclear Iran and have consistently found it intolerable. 2 The United States and Western powers brought Iran to the negotiation table and to signing a nuclear deal through escalating cycles of sanctions. 3 A successful conclusion of the negotiations should have presumably alleviated the concerns of alarmists in Israel. This however, is not the case. While the professional Israeli security elite considers favorably if cautiously the nuclear deal with Iran, 4 the political leadership remains antagonistic. Israel retains its invested GIL MEROM is a researcher in the Centre for International Security Studies (CISS) and the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney.He has been writing on various aspects of the democratic use of military force, and recently published in the Middle East Journal an article on Israel's preventive strike option against Iran. He is currently writing on democracy and collateral damage in asymmetric conflicts.

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Section: Assessing the Existential Nuclear Threat: The Strategic Contmentioning

confidence: 99%

Israeli Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threat

Merom¹

2017

Political Science Quarterly

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“…Paul (1995: 707), van Creveld (1993, Levite and Landau (1996: 36), and Ginor and Remez (2007) have argued that Egypt began its build-up in 1967 because of its desire to launch a preventive war before Israel could acquire nuclear weapons. The potential for proliferation was a substantial threat to Arab decision makers perceiving Israel's nuclear policy as a mechanism to empower its aggressive goals (Levite and Landau, 1996;Maoz, 2006).…”

Section: Proliferation In Practice: Israel and South Asiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Nuclear Weapons as Shields

Beardsley

Asal

2009

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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What security benefits do nuclear weapons provide to their possessors? After accounting for two potential selection effects, the empirical evidence from all international crises from 1945 to 2000 indicates that opponents of nuclear-weapon states demonstrate restraint in turning to violent aggression. Nuclear weapons, however, have little effect on overall crisis occurrence.The authors also explore the behavioral effects of nuclear-weapons programs and find that program states have a higher proclivity for crisis occurrence.

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Realism, Politics and Culture in Middle East Arms Control Negotiations

Steinberg¹

2005

Int Negot

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The history of arms control efforts in the Middle East consists of numerous initiatives, but very limited results. From the first efforts to negotiate WMD limits and non-proliferation arrangements in the 1960s, through various regional initiatives, frameworks, proposals, discussions, and negotiations, the obstacles to agreement on mutual limitations remained dominant. Frequent discussions in the UN of a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone (MENWFZ), the multi-lateral Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks initiated during the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference, and the regional dimensions of global frameworks such as the NPT, CWC, and CTBT have all failed to produce results.Detailed analysis of these efforts highlights the impact of realist security-based factors, the structure and process of the interactions, as well as the cultural and domestic political dimensions. The existential conflicts, reflected in protracted territorial disputes and denials of legitimacy and compounded by a fundamental asymmetry, created a zero-sum framework in the region. The region is characterized by a great deal of instability and competition; this situation, in turn, contributed to the efforts to acquire WMD. In terms of domestic politics, the regional cooperation required for arms limitation is often inconsistent with the dominant articulated political interests and regime perspectives. In addition, misunderstandings and misperceptions frequently occur due to the complexities of cross-cultural communications in the Middle East. Numerous dialogues have not narrowed the gaps or transformed the zero-sum frameworks into cooperative ones. Hopes for the creation of successful regional mechanisms for limiting arms depend on overcoming the obstacles encountered in past efforts.

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Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture, 1960-1967

Cited by 4 publications

References 1 publication

Israeli Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threat

Israeli Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threat

Nuclear Weapons as Shields

Realism, Politics and Culture in Middle East Arms Control Negotiations

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