Arcabouço teórico para os estudos de Governança Corporativa: os pressupostos subjacentes à Teoria da Agência

Correia, Laise Ferraz

doi:10.5700/rege334

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…According to Correia and Amaral (2008), the central assumption of the agency theory is the existence of conflicts in any relationship between a principal (in this case, UFU) and an agent (RTU), with the firm desire to maximize its own benefits. While most of the university community believes the foundation exists to meet UFU's needs, the foundation managers face the challenge of surviving, especially in financial terms, to achieve its activities and legal obligations.…”

Section: Lucimar Antônio Cabral De áVila / Carlos Osmar Berteromentioning

confidence: 99%

Third sector governance: a case study in a university support foundation

Ávila¹,

Bertero²

2016

RBGN

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Purpose -To establish a Governance Index (GOVI) to measure the relationship and influences with economic and financial performance and of volume of operations in a third sector entity.Design/methodology/approach -Exploratory, documentary and bibliographic research and content analysis, in order to achieve a GOVI derived from the use of independence, accountability and transparency variables in the period between 1986 and 2010. Questionnaires, administrative and accounting information are all used to characterize economic and financial performance indexes and determinants of the operations volume of the studied entity. Data was statistically processed through descriptive analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and logistic regression analysis.Findings -The research came to two conclusions: the proposed data collection instrument presented good adjustment indexes; and the GOVI has a significant relationship with the variables used to measure performance. This may indicate that determining the GOVI is a suitable tool for confrontation and measurement of performance of nonprofit organizations. Moreover, managers' independence should be largely used in management of third sector entities.Originality/value -The validation of the data collection instrument and the way the GOVI was obtained is one of the contributions of this study, since similar ways of measuring third sector performance were not found in literature. Choosing economic and financial performance and operations volume to study the relationship with the GOVI in nonprofit entities also was not found.

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Section: Lucimar Antônio Cabral De áVila / Carlos Osmar Berteromentioning

confidence: 99%

Third sector governance: a case study in a university support foundation

Ávila¹,

Bertero²

2016

RBGN

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“…Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define CG as a set of mechanisms that regulate the relationships of the decision makers in the company to ensure the return on the investment undertaken. Leal, Silva, and Fereira (2002) and Correia and Amaral (2006), in turn, reinforce that it is a system that encompasses a set of practices and formal monitoring processes of the management body, to preserve the interests of shareholders and mitigate conflicts of interest among stakeholders.…”

Section: Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 98%

Determinants of Board Size: A Longitudinal Analysis with 194 Firms Listed on the B3 S/A

Costa¹,

Barbosa²,

Bizarria³

et al. 2023

IJEF

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The research aims to analyze determinants of board size (BD) of companies listed on B3 S/A, from 2014 to 2019, with data collected by the Com.dinheiro.com platform. The hypotheses “firm size is positively related to board size” (H1); “firm ownership structure is negatively related to board size” (H2); and, “firm performance is positively related to board size” (H3), were quantitatively analyzed by multiple linear regression, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity tests and F-statistics, based on the variables: company size (TAMA); ownership structure; type of control; performance (EBITDA), and control variable, gender of the board of directors and the year. The results indicate that board size was explained by company size, ownership structure, and performance, confirming the three proposed hypotheses. For future research we suggest the use of other dependent variables that portray the board structure.

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“…Consoante com Jensen & Meckling (1976), esses custos aparecerão, inevitavelmente, em qualquer relacionamento que requeira a cooperação entre duas ou mais partes de um contrato (Correia & Amaral, 2008).…”

Section: Custos De Agênciaunclassified

“…De acordo com Correia & Amaral (2008), esses procedimentos ou mecanismos compreendem: a distribuição de direitos de decisão aos agentes com conhecimento específico para que eles os exerçam em todos os níveis da estrutura hierárquica; o sistema de controle, que proporciona a mensuração e a avaliação da performance dos agentes da decisão; e a recompensa e a punição dos agentes pela performance obtida, de modo a incentivar a eficiência no processo decisório.…”

Section: Custos De Agênciaunclassified

A influência da estrutura de propriedade nos custos de agência das instituições financeiras listadas na B3

Costa

Oliveira

Dieng

et al. 2021

Hermes

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O objetivo geral deste trabalho é analisar como a estrutura de propriedade influência os custos de agência nas instituições financeiras listada na B3. Os procedimentos metodológicos, são descritivos com abordagem quantitativa, a amostra composta por 26 companhias, analisadas no período de 2014 a 2018. A coleta de dados deu-se por meio formulário de referência para métrica de estrutura de propriedade, enquanto a métricas dos custos de agência deu-se por meio da Taxa de Retorno sobre o Ativo (TRA) e para a Relação Despesas com as Vendas (RDV) extraída das demonstrações financeiras. Os resultados encontrados indicam uma relação positiva de 0,196 entre as variáveis TRA e Participação Acionária com Nível de confiança de 99%; e também identificou-se relação positiva entre as variáveis TRA e RDV de 0,380, a nível de confiança de 95%. O teste de médias de Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney apontou que as empresas com participação acionária maior que 51% demonstram médias iguais às instituições com participação menor que 51%; no que se refere aos custos de agência referentes à variável TRA. Assim, as instituições com maior estrutura de propriedade demonstram melhores aplicabilidades dos ativos, e, dessa forma, menores custos de agência; as Joint Venture apresentam maiores custos de agência quando comparada com as companhias com controle individual; e, por fim, as companhias com capital votante maior que 51% também possuem maiores custos de agência quando comparado com aquelas com participação menor que 51%.

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Arcabouço teórico para os estudos de Governança Corporativa: os pressupostos subjacentes à Teoria da Agência

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Third sector governance: a case study in a university support foundation

Third sector governance: a case study in a university support foundation

Determinants of Board Size: A Longitudinal Analysis with 194 Firms Listed on the B3 S/A

A influência da estrutura de propriedade nos custos de agência das instituições financeiras listadas na B3

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