“…Surprisingly, the forum continued to function well even after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, which has been linked to trust established between individual delegates as well as the comparatively low salience of policy issues (although, at the time of writing, the future of the Council is open as a consequence of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022). For decades, the region has been marked by long-term national identity projects (Burke, 2017;Hansen-Magnusson, 2019a;Wood-Donnelly, 2019), albeit not at the level of intensity that is often portrayed by news outlets which like to evoke the headline-grabbing spectre of a heating "cold" war confrontation (Wehrmann, 2019): While the economic viability of resource exploitation is not a given (Keil, 2014), even disputes over the status of maritime zones around the archipelago of Svalbard and ensuing rights to issue fishing licences (Østhagen & Raspotnik, 2018) are mostly of interest for regional experts. Yet the security community is uncomfortable with Russia's refurbishment of some of the military infrastructure situated along the Northeast Passage (or Northern Sea Route), and the presence of China in the region, which has declared itself to be a near-Arctic state and is increasingly importing liquified natural gas from Russia while increasing its engagement in Arctic governance more generally (Kraska, 2011;Pelaudeix, 2018;Wilson, 2016).…”