Are default contributions sticky? An experimental analysis of defaults in public goods provision

Cappelletti, Dominique; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, Matteo

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.002

Cited by 22 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Our paper is closely related to Cappelletti et al (2014) but is different from Cappelletti et al (2014) in several aspects. Cappelletti et al (2014) found that the use of default contribution is preferred to simple contribution advice.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Since default options do not change the payoff structure of the game or the equilibrium outcomes, individuals still choose the best action for them. That is to say, default options should not matter (see Thaler and Sunstein 2008;Cappelletti et al 2014). Though mounting empirically evidence suggests that this might be unrealistic, we present this prediction for completeness.…”

Section: Prediction 2a (Rational Selfish Prediction) Default Optionsmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…Cappelletti et al (2014) found that the use of default contribution is preferred to simple contribution advice. It should be noted that in their paper, the default contribution adopted is analogous to our opt-in treatment but not to our opt-out treatment.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, Cappelletti et al (2014) explored channels through which a suggested contribution in a linear public goods game might influence the contribution decision. In particular, they varied the format of the suggested contribution (i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They found that subjects were more likely to accept the suggested contribution level when it was presented as a default contribution rather than as a contribution advice. The focus of the analysis in Cappelletti et al (2014) was twofold. Firstly, it was on the comparison of the role of default contribution amount vis-a-vis the role of contribution advice without default setting in motivating subjects to contribute to public goods provision.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games

Liu

Riyanto

2017

Soc Choice Welf

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It is well documented that people are reluctant to switch from a default option. We experimentally test the robustness of this behavioral inertia in a collective decision-making setting by varying the default option type and the decision-making environment. We examine the impacts of automatic-participation and no-participation default options on subjects' participation in a public goods provision and their contributions. Two variants of public goods game are employed: the linear and the threshold public goods games. The study shows the evidence of partial stickiness rather than complete stickiness of default options as indicated in empirical studies. Our experimental results square with the evidence of behavioral inertia only when the automatic-participation default is used. This default boosts contributions in the linear public goods game but not in the threshold public goods game. The evidence We thank Tim Cason, David Gill, Dan Houser, Juanjuan Meng, Andreas Ortmann, the editors, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at NTU, the International Meeting of the Economic Science Association (ESA) at New York University, the Australian Conference of Economists (ACE) in Melbourne, the Econometric Society North American Meeting at the University of Southern California, and the Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society at the National University of Singapore for their useful comments. Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s00355-017-1036-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Prediction 2a (Rational Selfish Prediction) Default Optionsmentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games

Liu

Riyanto

2017

Soc Choice Welf

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Crime and punishment in times of pandemics

Sarel

2021

Eur J Law Econ

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How should we think about crime deterrence in times of pandemics? The economic analysis of crime tells us that potential offenders will compare the costs and the benefits from crime and from innocence and then choose whichever option is more profitable. We must therefore ask ourselves how this comparison is affected by the outbreak of a pandemic and the policy changes which may accompany it, such as governmental restrictions, social distancing, and responses to economic crises. Using insights from law and economics, this paper investigates how the various components in the cost-benefit analysis of crime might change during a pandemic, focusing on Covid-19 as a test case. Building on classical theoretical models, existing empirical evidence, and behavioral aspects, the analysis reveals that there are many potentially countervailing effects on crime deterrence. The paper thus highlights the need to carefully consider which aspects are applicable given the circumstances of the pandemic, as whether crime deterrence will increase or decrease should depend on the strength of the effects at play.

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Higher quality and lower cost from improving hospital discharge decision making

Cox¹,

Sadiraj²,

Schnier

et al. 2016

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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This paper reports research on improving decisions about hospital discharges – decisions that are now made by physicians based on mainly subjective evaluations of patients’ discharge status. We report an experiment on uptake of our clinical decision support software (CDSS) which presents physicians with evidence-based discharge criteria that can be effectively utilized at the point of care where the discharge decision is made. One experimental treatment we report prompts physician attentiveness to the CDSS by replacing the default option of universal “opt in” to patient discharge with the alternative default option of “opt out” from the CDSS recommendations to discharge or not to discharge the patient on each day of hospital stay. We also report results from experimental treatments that implement the CDSS under varying conditions of time pressure on the subjects. The experiment was conducted using resident physicians and fourth-year medical students at a university medical school as subjects.

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Are default contributions sticky? An experimental analysis of defaults in public goods provision

Cited by 22 publications

References 42 publications

The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games

The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games

Crime and punishment in times of pandemics

Higher quality and lower cost from improving hospital discharge decision making

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