Are logical intuitions only make-believe? Reexamining the logic-liking effect.

Meyer-Grant, Constantin G.; Cruz, Nicole; Singmann, Henrik; Winiger, Samuel; Goswami, Spriha; Hayes, Brett K.; Klauer, Karl Christoph

doi:10.1037/xlm0001152

Cited by 16 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…The current work challenges this view. Our data and modeling of individual responding suggest that, like the logic-liking effect (Hayes et al, 2020; Meyer-Grant et al, 2021), the logic–brightness effect arises from task demands. The current work supports a signal competition account, whereby individuals try to fulfill the demand to make a perceptual discrimination, but when faced with a weak or ambiguous perceptual signal, a subset of participants instead attend to logical structure.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 66%

“…These results are analogous to the well-known effects of argument “atmosphere” on judgments of the validity of categorical syllogisms (e.g., Begg & Denny, 1969). Meyer-Grant et al (2021) showed that when these surface features and argument validity are deconfounded, the surface features are more likely to determine liking judgments than actual validity. Hence, an important issue for future work is to compare the relative influences of validity and linguistic surface features on brightness judgments for conditional and disjunctive arguments like those used in the current studies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The current experiments used versions of valid and invalid arguments that were similar to those used in previous studies of intuitive logic (e.g., Trippas et al, 2016). Meyer-Grant et al (2021), however, recently pointed out that these valid and invalid arguments also differ in other respects. For example, Table 1 shows that valid MP and invalid MP' arguments have a different linguistic surface structure.…”

Section: Implications For Dual-process 20mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Always look on the bright side of logic? Testing explanations of intuitive sensitivity to logic in perceptual tasks.

Hayes¹,

Stephens²,

Lee³

et al. 2022

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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Much recent research and theorizing in the field of reasoning has been concerned with intuitive sensitivity to logical validity, such as the logic-brightness effect, in which logically valid arguments are judged to have a "brighter" typeface than invalid arguments. We propose and test a novel signal competition account of this phenomenon. Our account makes two assumptions: (a) as per the demands of the logic-brightness task, people attempt to find a perceptual signal to guide brightness judgments, but (b) when the perceptual signal is hard to discern, they instead attend to cues such as argument validity. Experiment 1 tested this account by manipulating the difficulty of the perceptual contrast. When contrast discrimination was relatively difficult, we replicated the logic-brightness effect. When the discrimination was easy, the effect was eliminated. Experiment 2 manipulated the ambiguity of the perceptual task, comparing discrimination performance when the perceptual contrast was labeled in terms of rating "brightness" or "darkness". When the less ambiguous darkness labeling was used, there was no evidence of a logic-brightness effect. In both experiments, individual sensitivity to the perceptual discrimination was negatively correlated with sensitivity to argument validity. Hierarchical latent mixture modeling revealed distinct individual strategies: responses based on perceptual cues, responses based on validity or guessing. Consistent with the signal competition account, the proportion of those responding to validity increased with perceptual discrimination difficulty or task ambiguity. The results challenge explanations of the logic-brightness effect based on parallel dual-process models of reasoning.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 66%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Implications For Dual-process 20mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Always look on the bright side of logic? Testing explanations of intuitive sensitivity to logic in perceptual tasks.

Hayes¹,

Stephens²,

Lee³

et al. 2022

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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show abstract

“…In another study, such an effect continued to appear on pseudo-logical arguments even after participants were trained extensively in deductive logic rules (Ghasemi, Handley, & Stephens, 2022). Meyer-Grant et al (2021) also found similar logical intuition effects on pseudo-logical arguments using a liking judgment task.…”

Section: Matching Heuristicmentioning

confidence: 78%

Illusory intuitive inferences: Matching heuristics explain logical intuitions

2023

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“…Using conditional inference rules, Ghasemi et al (2022) have suggested that people could elaborate conclusions intuitively, and these inferences impact belief judgments, but these are not logical intuitions. The underlying mechanism of these inferences seemed to be the processing of more superficial structural features that happen to align with logical validity (see also Meyer-Grant et al, 2022, for other recent study that questions the existence of logical intuitions, using conditional and categorical syllogisms tasks).…”

Section: The Dual Process-logical Intuition Model: Are Type 1 Answers...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Heuristics, Biases and the Psychology of Reasoning: State of the Art

Martin¹,

Valiña²

2023

PSYCH

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Investigations on heuristics and biases have had a great impact on the study of reasoning and related higher cognitive processes, such as judgment and decision making. Specifically, the research in cognitive psychology of reasoning has revealed that people frequently activate mental shortcuts, or heuristics, to make inferences. These are non-logical strategies and could lead subjects to commit systematic deviations from the tenets of normative principles, that is, cognitive biases. The key objective of this paper is to present some of the most relevant theories on heuristics and biases in reasoning, focusing on the dual process theories of deduction. According to these theories, there are two kinds of thinking. Type 1, automatic, unconscious, implicit, fast and effortless and Type 2, reflective, controlled, conscious, explicit, slow and effortful. Much debate on these theories has emphasized on the relationship between both types of processes and the underlying factors that could triggered one or other. In this regard, different dual-process theories propose distinct answers to these questions. The results in the literature have registered that the likelihood of activation of Type 1 and Type 2 processes has important consequences on reasoning, both in experimental laboratory tasks and in everyday situations. Recent empirical investigations that have studied the critical role that intuitive and deliberative processes play in different professional areas are displayed. It is a key question that future research continues with the study of the underlying procedures that professionals activate for reasoning and decision making.

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Are logical intuitions only make-believe? Reexamining the logic-liking effect.

Cited by 16 publications

References 68 publications

Always look on the bright side of logic? Testing explanations of intuitive sensitivity to logic in perceptual tasks.

Always look on the bright side of logic? Testing explanations of intuitive sensitivity to logic in perceptual tasks.

Illusory intuitive inferences: Matching heuristics explain logical intuitions

Heuristics, Biases and the Psychology of Reasoning: State of the Art

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