2018
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12308
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Are sequential round‐robin tournaments discriminatory?

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…2 The reason is a discouragement effect of trailing players that has been identified in most forms of dynamic contests (Konrad, 2009, Chapter 8). Sahm (2017) confirms this result for round-robin tournaments where each single match is organized as a Tullock contest. The extent of discrimination is, however, much smaller than with matches organized as all-pay auctions because the discouragement of trailing players in asymmetric intermediate stages is less pronounced due to the non-perfectly discriminating character of the Tullock contest.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 71%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…2 The reason is a discouragement effect of trailing players that has been identified in most forms of dynamic contests (Konrad, 2009, Chapter 8). Sahm (2017) confirms this result for round-robin tournaments where each single match is organized as a Tullock contest. The extent of discrimination is, however, much smaller than with matches organized as all-pay auctions because the discouragement of trailing players in asymmetric intermediate stages is less pronounced due to the non-perfectly discriminating character of the Tullock contest.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 71%
“…0.3494 0.5000 0.6342 0.1239 0.2500 0.3674 0.2262 0.2500 0.2668 P2 0.3071 0.5000 0.6686 0.0978 0.2500 0.4161 0.2070 0.2500 0.2525 P3 0.3435 0.5000 0.6972 0.1181 0.2500 0.4547 0.2253 0.2500 0.2424 rel.SD 0.0561 0 0.0386 0.0988 0 0.0865 0.0387 0 0.0393 0.3398 0.7500 1.2383 0.6585 0.7500 0.7617 a lean-back effect. Without a second prize (a = 0), the player who skips the first match (player 3) has an (expected) disadvantage when he faces the winner of the first match that discourages him from exerting equivalent effort (Sahm, 2017). 8 Introducing a second prize mitigates this discouragement effect: With a second prize, the winner of the first match has a positive payoff even if he loses his next match and ranks second.…”
Section: Tournament Equilibriamentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Third, it is almost impossible to adequately address all issues influencing match outcomes. For instance, the schedule of round-robin tournaments may result in a substantial advantage for some contestants as recent analytical (Krumer et al, 2017a(Krumer et al, , 2020Sahm, 2019) and empirical works (Krumer & Lechner, 2017) show. Similarly, even the kick-off time can affect various aspects of games such as the home advantage of the underdog team (Krumer, 2020).…”
Section: The Simulation Of Match Outcomesmentioning
confidence: 99%