Are States under a Prospective Duty to Create and Maintain Militaries?

Abstract

Suppose it is foreseeable that you will soon encounter a drowning child, whom you will only be able to rescue if you learn to swim. In this scenario we might think that you have a “prospective duty” to take swimming lessons given that this will be necessary to perform the future rescue. Cécile Fabre argues that, by parity of reasoning, states have a prospective duty to build and maintain military establishments. My argument in this essay pulls in the opposite direction. First, I emphasize that learning to swim is only a prospective duty under very specific circumstances. Normally there is no such duty; hence, we do not normally think that people deserve moral censure for choosing to forego swimming lessons. I then argue that, similarly, while a prospective duty to build a military can arise under some conceivable circumstances, these are not the circumstances that most states today find themselves in. I then suggest a more fitting domestic analogy to guide our thinking about this issue: Maintaining a standing army is less like learning to swim and more like keeping an assault weapon in the home “just in case.” This analogy supports a defeasible presumption against militarization.

Supererogatory and obligatory rescues: Should we institutionalize the duty to intervene?

“…The argument that the planners in Future Beach violate their prospective duty is fairly straightforward-the likelihood of people getting in trouble in the water is always high, especially in the sea; given the dangers involved, City Council's help seems crucial, and the costs of creating a lifeguard post are relatively small. However, it may now be reasonably objected that this is where my analogies break down (cf., Dobos, 2021). After all, it is not clear that the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies occurring is high, nor that intervention is necessary to stop such emergencies.…”

“…However, it may now be reasonably objected that this is where my analogies break down (cf., Dobos, 2021). After all, it is not clear that the likelihood of humanitarian emergencies occurring is high, nor that intervention is necessary to stop such emergencies.…”

“…It is not easy to say what the likelihood of future humanitarian emergencies is. On the one hand, international conflict has been, seemingly, declining (see Dobos, 2021: pp. 412–4).…”