Argumentative Polylogues in a Dialectical Framework: A Methodological Inquiry

Lewiński, Marcin; Aakhus, Mark

doi:10.1007/s10503-013-9307-x

Cited by 125 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Typically, different parties argue for the contextual betterness of their proposals for action {M, N, O… Z} (see the "M is the Best" box). Their deliberation develops then as an argumenta-tive polylogue (Lewiński, 2014;Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014) along the lines of possible disagreements over the various elements of the structure (basic premises, inference rules and contextual criteria).…”

Section: Values (V)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One can start thinking of an advocacy procedure for practical argumentation in terms of the existing role-based dialectical models but extended to incorporate the clash of more than just two positions on an issue; in this way, the model will be a model of a polylogue (Lewiński, 2014;Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014). Such a procedure can be constructed in a largely formal manner or informally, using the extant pragmatically-oriented dialectical approaches as a basic theoretical background.…”

Section: How To Advocate In Practical Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…57ff.). The four stages can define the procedure for multi-party argumentation in general (Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014), but they can also be crafted to advocacybased deliberation in particular. In the latter case, the scheme of practical argument expounded in section 2 can serve as the pattern of relevance for all argumentative moves in deliberation.…”

Section: How To Advocate In Practical Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a dyadic discussion, this is a fairly straightforward business, since arguers can choose from but two options: that "the protagonist's standpoint is acceptable and the antagonist's doubt must be retracted, or that the standpoint of the protagonist must be retracted" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 61). Such a limitation to duality is an all-too-common trick in the literature (see Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014 for an overview). Witness Chang's strategy who, upfront, declares that: "To simplify, I will henceforth treat choice situations as involving only two alternatives" (2016, p. 215).…”

Section: Concludingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Practical Argumentation as Reasoned Advocacy

Lewiński

2017

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Abstract:The paper offers a theoretical investigation into the sources of normativity in practical argumentation. The chief question is: Do we need objectively-minded, unbiased arguers or can we count on "good" argumentative processes in which individual biases cancel each other out? I address this question by analysing a detailed structure of practical argument and its varieties, and by discussing the tenets of a comparative approach to practical reason. I argue that given the comparative structure proposed, reasoned advocacy in argumentative activity upholds reasonableness whenever that activity is adequately designed. I propose some basic rules for such a design of practical argumentation.Résumé: Cet article offre un examen théorique des sources de normativité dans l'argumentation pratique. La question principale qui nous occupe est la suivante: avons-nous besoin d'argumentateurs objectifs et non-biaisés ou pouvons-nous compter sur de "bons" processus argumentatifs susceptibles de neutraliser les biais individuels? Je traite d'abord cette question à travers une analyse de la structure détaillée de l'argumentation pratique et de ses variétés et ensuite par une discussion des fondements d'une approche comparative de la raison pratique. Je défends l'idée que selon la structure comparative proposée, tout plaidoyer raisonné dans une activité argumentative maintient la raisonnabilité tant que cette activité est conçue de manière appropriée. Je propose quelques règles de base pour une telle conception de l'argumentation pratique.

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Section: Values (V)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: How To Advocate In Practical Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: How To Advocate In Practical Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Concludingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Practical Argumentation as Reasoned Advocacy

Lewiński

2017

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“…Unfortunately, you sometimes have no answer, or not all the answers, to these questions. Tough cases are also likely to appear because some actual situations are closer to polylogues than to paradigmatic face-to-face dialogues and raise specific communicational problems (Sylvan 1985, Lewinski & Aakhus 2014, Lewinski 2014). Yet I will show that, even if all these preliminary questions are answered, the orthodox distinction between argument and explanation is not sufficient to avoid tough cases.…”

Section: Ways Of Distinguishing Argument and Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Argument or Explanation: Who is to Decide?

Dufour

2017

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Abstract:Granting that explanations that answer a why-question, and arguments, are the products of two species of the activity of reasongiving, do they make an exclusive and exhaustive classification? The orthodox distinction between explanation and argument is based on the status of their conclusion: is it accepted or not? However, this view faces some tough cases, which are discussed. Most of the criteria used to distinguish argument and explanation according to the orthodox view cause tough cases to proliferate and hardly accommodate common communicative situations. This suggests that the orthodox distinction is not satisfactory.Résumé : Une fois concédé que les explications répondant à une question "Pourquoi?" et les arguments sont deux espèces de l'acte consistant à fournir des raisons, l'article demande si elles en forment une classification exclusive et exhaustive. La distinction orthodoxe entre une explication et un argument repose sur le statut de sa conclusion : est-elle acceptée ou non ? Cette distinction fait cependant face à des cas embarrassants que l'on va discuter. La plupart des critères utilisés pour distinguer argument et explication dans le respect de cette orthodoxie induisent une prolifération de cas embarrassants et peinent à rendre compte de situations communicationnelles banales. Ceci invite à penser que la distinction orthodoxe n'est pas satisfaisante.

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Argumentation Theory

Lewiński

Mohammed

2016

The International Encyclopedia of Communication Theory and Philosophy

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Argumentation theory investigates the practices and standards of using arguments. Argumentation is understood as a communicative activity of producing and exchanging reasons in the context of doubt or disagreement. It thus constitutes or contributes to a wide range of fundamental social processes, from political debates to legal disputes, scientific inquiry, and interpersonal conflicts. In contrast to much research within communication, argumentation theory combines descriptive study of how we argue with normative inquiry into the standards of good argumentation. In this sense, it has a long interdisciplinary tradition that starts with ancient rhetoric, dialectic, and logic and continues today to include recent research in areas such as online communication and artificial intelligence.

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Argumentative Polylogues in a Dialectical Framework: A Methodological Inquiry

Cited by 125 publications

References 39 publications

Practical Argumentation as Reasoned Advocacy

Practical Argumentation as Reasoned Advocacy

Argument or Explanation: Who is to Decide?

Argumentation Theory

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