2017
DOI: 10.1007/s10503-017-9434-x
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Arguments from Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias

Abstract: Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments are reliable, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In my (2013), I considered a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are more likely to be true than novice judgments, and discussed empirical evidence suggesting that expert judgments are not more reliable than novice judgments or eve… Show more

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Cited by 17 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…For this update, a stakeholder group with allergists, dermatologists, pediatricians, epidemiologists, and immunologists, developed the review protocol and made an open invitation to SLAAI members to participate. 21 Subsequently, those members who correctly performed the protocol tasks and writing the guide were included in the staff.…”
Section: Staff Conformationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For this update, a stakeholder group with allergists, dermatologists, pediatricians, epidemiologists, and immunologists, developed the review protocol and made an open invitation to SLAAI members to participate. 21 Subsequently, those members who correctly performed the protocol tasks and writing the guide were included in the staff.…”
Section: Staff Conformationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…I have argued that, rather than take it for granted, we need a justification for it. A justification for "the background norm of respect for expertise" is especially urgent in light of evidence from studies on expertise suggesting that expert opinion is not as reliable as we might think (Mizrahi 2013a;2016a) and that expert judgments are susceptible to pretty much the same cognitive biases that novice judgments are susceptible to (Mizrahi 2018).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The objects we have called warranting devices are obvious candidates for disestablishment, either because experience in their use exposes an unnoticed problem or because some new invention obsolesces what was previously the best-known way to reach a conclusion in a given domain. But even familiar presumptive reasoning schemes, like Argument from Expert Opinion, can be the target of a warrant-disestablishing argument; such an argument would focus on new reasons to doubt the reliability of the formerly trusted scheme, as in Mizrahi's recent reexamination of trust in experts [12,13]. For computational modeling, interesting challenges surround the process by which arguers maintain a repertoire of forms over time through additions, transformations, and even removals.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%