Aristotle’s Model of Animal Motion

Corcilius, Klaus; Gregorić, Pavel

doi:10.1163/15685284-12341242

Cited by 56 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…As I have argued elsewhere, 12 I take awareness to coincide with each cognitive energeia as its side-effect. I agree with Corcilius and Gregorić (2013) that this awareness arises when the motion that is perception reaches the central sense organ in or around the heart. Unfortunately, this awareness is not an active response or contribution of the perceptual system towards the event of perception, but, as Aristotle explains, a concomitant of every act of cognition, perception and thought alike.…”

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confidence: 54%

“…The resulting juxtaposition of the incoming perceptible value with the soul's neutral value generates a contrast and this contrast is the actual sense object." For more details see Corcilius and Gregorić (2013). 22 As Aristotle calls it at De anima III.7.431a10-11: τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι.…”

Section: Revot)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the multiple functions of the common sense see, e.g., Gregorić (2007). 20 Corcilius (2014) and Corcilius and Gregorić (2013). See also Bradshaw (1997) and Johansen (2002, 177-182).…”

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Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Active Intellectual Cognition

Haas

Decaix²,

Mora-Márquez³

2020

Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind

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Since Antiquity, "active cognition" has been a problematic notion in Aristotelian scholarship. Part of the problem is the definition of what counts as "active". In the first part of this paper I shall offer a short survey on various contenders for "active" perceptual cognition defended in recent interpretations of Aristotle, by way of introduction to the more complicated problems of "active" intellectual cognition. In the second part of the paper I will offer-in outline-my interpretation of Aristotle's theory of intellectual cognition, which takes the most recent findings in the area of perceptual cognition as a starting point. Here I pursue the analogy that Aristotle sets up between perception and intellection throughout the De anima.In the third part of the paper I shall examine a number of influential accounts of active intellectual cognition found in the corpus of Alexander of Aphrodisias, in particular Mantissa 2-5 (also known as De intellectu). These accounts each develop the analogies offered in Aristotle's De anima III.5 in their own way. The "Activity" of Perceptual Cognition in AristotleAccording to Aristotle all cognition, both perceptual and intellectual, has different stages of "activity" or rather "actuality", "actualisation", or "completion" (energeia, entelecheia) which correspond to preceding stages of potentiality. 1 At birth all healthy and unimpaired animals are composites of a soul that possesses the power of perception in (first) actuality, and a body equipped with the necessary sense organs. Each organ is ready to perceive its own special objects (the eyes see colour, the 1 The central chapter where Aristotle applies, and adapts, the notions of potentiality and actuality to psychology is De anima II.5, for which see, e.g., Burnyeat (2002) and Johansen (2012). For my own approach to the topic see De Haas (2018b).

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confidence: 54%

Section: Revot)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Active Intellectual Cognition

Haas

Decaix²,

Mora-Márquez³

2020

Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind

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“…Probably, one of the first descriptions of animal movements was depicted in various parietal arts by representations of their behaviors (e.g., feeding and vigilance behaviors in large herbivorous mammals, predation behaviors in carnivores), and their “psycho-physiological” status through facial expressions (e.g., head expressions in hunting Felidae) [ 2 , 3 ]. For a long historical period, the representation of postures ( Figure 1 ) or a series of postures remained the unique way to illustrate behaviors [ 4 , 5 ] related to human activities, such as hunting, agriculture, war, religious ceremonies, entertainment (e.g., feasts, circus arena), and torture. The illustrated postures of locomotion in many vertebrates (e.g., dogs, cats, horses, cows, elephants) are typical examples of “frozen” representations of behavioral sequences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Studies of the Behavioral Sequences: The Neuroethological Morphology Concept Crossing Ethology and Functional Morphology

Bels

Pallandre

Pellé

et al. 2022

Animals

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Postures and movements have been one of the major modes of human expression for understanding and depicting organisms in their environment. In ethology, behavioral sequence analysis is a relevant method to describe animal behavior and to answer Tinbergen’s four questions testing the causes of development, mechanism, adaptation, and evolution of behaviors. In functional morphology (and in biomechanics), the analysis of behavioral sequences establishes the motor pattern and opens the discussion on the links between “form” and “function”. We propose here the concept of neuroethological morphology in order to build a holistic framework for understanding animal behavior. This concept integrates ethology with functional morphology, and physics. Over the past hundred years, parallel developments in both disciplines have been rooted in the study of the sequential organization of animal behavior. This concept allows for testing genetic, epigenetic, and evo-devo predictions of phenotypic traits between structures, performances, behavior, and fitness in response to environmental constraints. Based on a review of the literature, we illustrate this concept with two behavioral cases: (i) capture behavior in squamates, and (ii) the ritualistic throat display in lizards.

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“…Parmi ceux-ci, on a déjà parlé des animaux » (De motu animalium, 4, 700a 16, trad. P.-M. Morel).20 VoirFurley (1978),Nussbaum (1978, 114-125),,Berryman (2002),Morison (2004),Corcilius and Gregoric (2013),Rashed (2014) etMorel (2007Morel ( , 137-150) et (2014.…”

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Mouvements et vie chez Aristote : Quelques remarques « autour » des plantes

Bénatouïl

2019

AFCL

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Este artigo aborda asrelações entre vida e movimento em Aristóteles, examinando a distinção entre plantas e animais. Pode o movimento local servir como critério para estabelecer a fronteira entre plantas e animais? Mostramos que a resposta é negativa ao mesmo tempo por causa da existência de animais imóveis, e de não-viventes móveis, e porque somente o automovimento, e não o movimento em si mesmo, pode ser tomado por critério verdadeiro da vida. Mostramos em que sentido as plantas são automotoras. O caso dos animais incertos permite ainda compreender melhor o estatuto da fronteira entre plantas e animais entre os viventes e as analogias que existem entre eles.

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Aristotle’s Model of Animal Motion

Cited by 56 publications

References 8 publications

Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Active Intellectual Cognition

Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Active Intellectual Cognition

Studies of the Behavioral Sequences: The Neuroethological Morphology Concept Crossing Ethology and Functional Morphology

Mouvements et vie chez Aristote : Quelques remarques « autour » des plantes

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