Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's own senses are active. Observing that other animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the ‘common sense’ (koine aisthesis, sensus communis). Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. This book offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. This book begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, this book provides an examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.

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In this paper we argue that Aristotle operates with a particular theoretical model in his explanation of animal locomotion, what we call the 'centralized incoming and outgoing motions' (CIOM) model. We show how the model accommodates more complex cases of animal motion and how it allows Aristotle to preserve the intuition that animals are selfmovers, without jeopardizing his arguments for the eternity of motion and the necessary existence of one eternal unmoved mover in PhysicsYWl. The CIOM model helps to elucidate Aristotle's two central yet problematic claims, namely that the soul is the efficient cause of animal motion and that it is the internal supporting-point necessary for animal motion. Moreover, the CIOM model helps us to explain the difference between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary motions, and to square Aristotle's cardiocentrism with his hylomorphism, but also, more generally, it provides an interesting way of thinking about the place of intentionality in the causal structure of the world.

The concept of species is one of the core concepts in biology and one of the cornerstones of evolutionary biology, yet it is rife with conceptual problems. Philosophers of biology have been discussing the concept of species for decades, and in doing so they sometimes appeal to the views of biologists. However, their statements as to what biologists think are seldom supported by empirical data. In order to investigate what biologists actually think about the key issues related to the problem of species, we have conducted a survey on the sample of 193 biologists from the population of biologists from over 150 biology departments at universities in the US and the EU. This article presents and discusses the results of the survey. Some results confirm and others falsify the reiterated statements of philosophers of biology as to what biologists think, but all results we obtained should be informative and relevant for future discussions of the problem of species.

The aim of this paper is to depict the anatomical and physiological doctrines of the treatise entitled Περι πνευματος, or De spiritu. By closely examining the contents of the treatise on its own accord, rather than through its Aristotelian or Hellenistic contexts, we attempt to overcome the aporetic and often disconnected style of the author, and to present a coherent picture of his doctrine of pneuma, its roles in the body, the anatomical structures in which it acts, and its relation to the soul. We argue that the author envisions three main systems in the body: artēriai, by which external air is taken in, turned into pneuma and distributed to different parts of the body; phlebes, by which blood is produced and distributed; bones and neura, which support the body and effect locomotion. Pneuma is shown to run through the system of artēriai, whereby it performs vital activities such as thermoregulation, digestion and pulsation. It is also engaged in activities such as perception and locomotion, in the form of the "connate pneuma," which, we propose, is a component of bodily parts. The author connects pneuma very closely with soul, and although he is familiar with Aristotle's doctrine of the soul, he does not see to embrace it.