Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal

Abstract

In De anima 3.5, Aristotle argues for the existence of a second intellect, the socalled ÒAgent Intellect.Ó The logical structure of his argument turns on a distinction between different types of soul, rather than different faculties within a given soul; and the attributes he assigns to the second species make it clear that his concern here -as at the climax of his other great works, such as the Metaphysics , the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics -is the difference between the human and the divine. If this is right, we neednÕt go on a wild goose chase trying to invent a role for the so-called Agent Intellect to play. God moves our intellects as he moves the heavenly spheres, Òas a belovedÓ: he constitutes the complete actualization towards which all of our intellectual striving is directed. Aristotle regards such nal causation as an ef cient cause, but not in a way that would make it part of what we would call the causal processes or mechanisms of human psychology. But, he would insist, it is essential for appreciating who we are and what our place is in the world.

Philosopher’s Theoretical Life vs. Auto-deification? Possible readings of Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics”, book X.

“…Unfortunately, I believe this to be a dead end. I will show it by presenting the counterarguments to two of Caston's eleven points of comparison (for more see Caston, 1999). First of all, Aristotle calls Deity timiotaton (the best), and mind: timioteron (better).…”

Nousin Aristotle'sDe Anima

“…Over the last 20 years, a number of scholars have answered this first question by maintaining that the productive intellect is not a human intellect but is instead the divine intellect of Metaphysics Λ (e.g. Frede, “La theorie aristotelicienne de l'intellect agent”; Caston, “Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal,” and Burnyeat). On this view, the productive intellect makes things intelligible by being the first intelligible, giving structure and intelligibility to the entire universe.…”

“…This is all that Aristotle's claims about the productive intellect mean. The productive intellect does not play any particular causal role in individual episodes of human thinking (Caston, “Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal”).…”

“…The third interpretation, like the other two, faces some difficulties. Caston has claimed that this sort of interpretation invents a gap in Aristotle's account where none exists, just in order to make up something for the productive intellect to do (Caston, “Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal” 200). Further, on this view, the productive intellect is just a power that enables something else to understand, but many have thought it should itself be actively understanding, especially since it is supposed to be essentially active.…”

“…This approach has seen a resurgence in the last two decades (e.g. Wedin; Frede, “On Aristotle's Conception of Soul;” Caston, “Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal;” Burnyeat). It also has ancient and medieval antecedents going back at least to Alexander of Aphrodisias…”