Armaments after autonomy: Military adaptation and the drive for domestic defence industries

Abstract

State investments in domestic defense industries are one of the most puzzling trends in international relations. Over 60 states devote scarce assets to such industries. Economists contend that these investments waste resources because most states could procure their weaponry more cost-effectively from international markets. Political scientists, furthermore, claim that the resulting overproduction of armaments fuels arms races. Why then do governments cultivate domestic defence industries and what benefits do they provide? I argue in the following pages that the answers to these questions are distinct. Fears about supply security frequently spur states to begin developing arms industries and elites' technonationalist beliefs often sustain their defence-industrial investments. Defence industries' primary national security value, however, lies in their hitherto unappreciated contribution to states' military adaptation capacity. Since warfare is unpredictable, victories are oftentimes won by whichever side adapts faster to battlefields' unexpected realities. Even small defense industries, within these circumstances, boost states' capacity for military adaptation. Cases drawn from Israel's, South Africa's and Iraq's experiences demonstrate both military adaptation's role in driving governments to sustain their investments in domestic defense industries as well as the complementary impacts of supply security and technonationalist considerations.