Armed Groups and Militarized Elections

Staniland, Paul

doi:10.1111/isqu.12195

Cited by 39 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 53 publications

(54 reference statements)

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“…Brokers prefer to use targeted forms of intimidation rather than indiscriminate or extreme violence. In this sense, they differ from armed groups that use violence to back political parties (Staniland 2015;Matanock and Staniland 2018). Brokers are concerned with the costs associated with damaged reputations in a way that armed insurgents are not.…”

Section: The Logic Of Voter Intimidationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carrots and sticks: Experimental evidence of vote-buying and voter intimidation in Guatemala

González-Ocantos

Jonge

Meléndez

et al. 2019

Journal of Peace Research

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How do parties target intimidation and vote-buying during elections? Parties prefer the use of carrots over sticks because they are in the business of getting voters to like them and expect higher legitimacy costs if observers expose intimidation. However, their brokers sometimes choose intimidation because it is cheaper and possibly more effective than vote-buying. Specifically, we contend that brokers use intimidation when the cost of buying votes is prohibitively high; in interactions with voters among whom the commitment problem inherent to clientelistic transactions is difficult to overcome; and in contexts where the risk of being denounced for violence is lower. We probe our hypotheses about the different profile of voters targeted with vote-buying and intimidation using two list experiments included in an original survey conducted during the 2011 Guatemalan general elections. The list experiments were designed to overcome the social desirability bias associated with direct questions about illegal or stigmatized behaviors. Our quantitative analysis is supplemented by interviews with politicians from various parties. The analysis largely confirms our expectations about the diametrically opposed logics of vote-buying and intimidation targeting, and illuminates how both are key components of politics in a country with weak parties and high levels of violence.

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Section: The Logic Of Voter Intimidationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carrots and sticks: Experimental evidence of vote-buying and voter intimidation in Guatemala

González-Ocantos

Jonge

Meléndez

et al. 2019

Journal of Peace Research

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“…To begin with, it is important to note that proxy wars have been studied across several research clusters dealing directly or indirectly with the topic: Cold War historiography 27 , intelligence studies 28 , and the emerging research on external support and proxy wars 29 . The latter now also includes research on external support and its effects on group cohesion and performance 30 , the role of proxy actors in electoral violence 31 , and war termination. 32 Adding to this is the study of proxy actors as key operatives of military purges 33 and wartime sexual violence 34 , and, finally, as swapping roles and functions with (other) nonstate actors, most notably, militias 35 .…”

Section: Minimizing Terminological Reachmentioning

confidence: 99%

A structural-relational analysis of party dynamics in proxy wars

Rauta

2018

International Relations

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Proxy wars are still under-represented in conflict research and a key cause for this is the lack of conceptual and terminological care. This article seeks to demonstrate that minimizing terminological diffusion increases overall analytical stability by maximising conceptual rigor. The argument opens with a discussion on the terminological ambivalence resulting from the haphazard employment of labels referencing the parties involved in proxy wars. Here, the article introduces an analytical framework with a twofold aim: to reduce label heterogeneity, and to argue in favour of understanding proxy war dynamics as overlapping dyads between a Beneficiary, a Proxy, and a Target. This is then applied to the issues of defining and theorising party dynamics in proxy wars. It does so by providing a structural-relational analysis of the interactions between the above-mentioned parties based on strategic interaction. It presents a tentative explanation of the proxy relationship by correlating the Beneficiary's goal towards the Target with the Proxy's preference for the Beneficiary. In adding the goal-preference relational heuristic, the article advances the recent focus on strategic interaction with a novel variant to explanations based on interest, power, cost-benefit considerations, or ideology.

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“…Using data from Africa, Daxecker (2012) argues international monitoring of flawed elections can raise the salience of fraud and consequently the risk of postelection violence, and Kasara (2015) shows how violence may also influence future (and not just upcoming) elections in Kenya. 5 Most directly related to our model is a burgeoning empirical literature which focuses specifically on spikes in violence, repression, and terrorism during electoral periods (Bekoe 2012;Goldsmith 2014;Newman 2013;Norris, Frank, and Martinez i Coma 2015;Staniland 2015). 5 Most directly related to our model is a burgeoning empirical literature which focuses specifically on spikes in violence, repression, and terrorism during electoral periods (Bekoe 2012;Goldsmith 2014;Newman 2013;Norris, Frank, and Martinez i Coma 2015;Staniland 2015).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Violence Cycle

Harish

Little

2017

Am Polit Sci Rev

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E lections are often violent affairs, casting doubt on the canonical claim that democracy makes societies more peaceful by creating nonviolent means to contest for power. We develop a formal argument to demonstrate that this conclusion is incorrect. Holding elections has a direct effect of increasing levels of violence close to the voting, as this is when electoral violence can influence political outcomes. Precisely for this reason, elections also have an indirect effect of decreasing levels of violence at all other times, as parties can wait for the election when their efforts are more likely to succeed. The direct and indirect effects generate a "political violence cycle" that peaks at the election. However, when the indirect effect is larger, politics would be more violent without elections. When elections also provide an effective nonviolent means to contest for power, they unambiguously make society more peaceful while still generating a political violence cycle.Sick of elecshun [sic] related violence and terror attacks. Can't wait for elecshuns to be over and get non-elecshun related violence back.-A tweet from the satirical and pseudonymous @majorlyp during the 2013 Pakistani elections

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Armed Groups and Militarized Elections

Cited by 39 publications

References 53 publications

Carrots and sticks: Experimental evidence of vote-buying and voter intimidation in Guatemala

Carrots and sticks: Experimental evidence of vote-buying and voter intimidation in Guatemala

A structural-relational analysis of party dynamics in proxy wars

The Political Violence Cycle

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