Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict

Abstract

There are both military and political dimensions to arms transfers, and their effects on state behavior may not be the same. In this article I examine the degree to which arms transfers and arms transfer dependence interact to affect foreign policy conflict. I hypothesize that, as a transfer of military capability, weapons shipments increase the tendency of the recipient to strike a conflictual posture in its foreign policy, while arms transfer dependence restrains that tendency. An arms recipient faces the possibility that weapons shipments will be curtailed during periods of regional crisis and hostility, and when a state is dependent on one or a few major suppliers for the bulk of its imported weaponry, the costs associated with supply restrictions increases. This should encourage restraint on the part of states otherwise emboldened by arms acquisitions. My analysis treats conflictual behavior as a multiplicative function of arms transfers and arms transfer dependence. Parameter estimates are derived from time series data for nine states engaged in enduring rivalries during the Cold War. For some of these states, there is evidence that arms shipments encouraged more conflictual foreign policies; but there is also evidence that this propensity was tempered by the degree of arms transfer dependence. The model is non-linear, so the precise effects of dependence vary depending on context - i.e. the state's current level of arms importation and dependence - but realistic predictions involve changes in foreign policy conflict equal to 5-25% of their mean levels during the period.

Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports

“…A number of studies have assessed the consistency between support for these principles and the use of instruments of U.S. foreign policy such as sanctions (Weiss 1999), foreign aid (Meernik et al 1998;Apodaca and Stohl 1999), and intervention (Kegley and Hermann 1996). Studies of arms transfers have focused on foreign policy concerns such as the promotion of regional stability (Sanjian 1999) and foreign policy conflict (Kinsella 1998). Competitive aspects of superpower arms transfer policies during the Cold War (Mintz 1986), and the impact of these arms transfers on regional conflict (Kinsella 1994(Kinsella , 1995, have also been analyzed.…”

The Gravity of Arms

“…The armament industry has usually seen as particularly different from other industries (Kinsella, 1998;Blanton, 2000) regarding the role played by the political environment and the geopolitics of transfers in the decision to export (Catrina, 1998;Krause, 1991Krause, , 1992Anderton, 1995). Many developing countries have been increasing their capacity to produce arms and some are trying to establish a domestic military industry to be less dependent on imported arms (Brauer 2000;Blanton, 2005).…”

The role and capabilities of major weapon systems transferred between 1950 and 2010: Empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set

“…This article categorizes arms to show that there are important differences that are not accounted for with the traditional SIPRI TIV (for previous use see Kinsella 1994Kinsella , 1998Kinsella , 2002 or the WMEAT measure (for previous use see Blanton 1999Blanton , 2000Blanton , 2005 that quantitative analyses use to measure arms transfers (Moore 2012 is a notable exception). The TIV does not take into account the type of arms transferred, but the aggregate military volume in the form of a dollar amount of all weapon systems transferred.…”