This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/52939/ Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the The author received no funding from any grant-awarding body.The author has no conflicts of interests based on the direct applications of this research. 2 AbstractArms transfers provide exporters an avenue to provide security to other states while gaining economic benefits. Arms transfers provide importers an avenue to gain security without having to rely on alliances. Past research uses aggregate measures of the monetary or security value of major weapon system transfers without accounting for strategic differences in possible use in interstate and civil conflict. This article presents a data set on interstate transfers of major weapon systems between 1950 and 2010 building upon SIPRI's Arms Trade Register with several improvements. First, it disaggregates land weapons and air weapons into categories reflecting their strategic capabilities. Second, model level characteristics (e.g. age, speed, and range) are drawn from Jane's Defence sources. Additionally, the data set covers a larger range of time and states than previous data sets categorizing arms. To demonstrate the usefulness this article first presents summary statistics of the data set and then replicates Blanton (2005) to show that the effect of human rights and regime types on United States transfers differs across the categories of arms compared to alternative measures of arms transfers.

Quantitative research on arms transfers has not adequately accounted for broader theories of international relations. We review the specialized literature on arms transfers and examine how arms transfers fit with the broad international relations theories. We derive and test seven hypotheses based on realist, liberal and constructivist theories using a dataset of all non-US/Russian aircraft transfers between 1990 and 2010. We find limited support for realist hypotheses. We find little support for hypotheses derived from the Democratic Peace literature, but some support for liberal trade arguments. We also find some support for constructivist arguments based on shared identity and prestige measures.

In the past, refugee camp security has been examined in many lights; however, the demographic make-up of camps has not been focused on. In this article, I present a quantitative model that examines attacks on refugee camps. I argue that the likelihood of an attack on a camp is affected by the demographic make-up of the camp. The primary demographic causes that affect vulnerability are the level of male population of the camp, age of camp residents, and the size of the camp. With the available data, I find that these demographic indicators are significant in determining the likelihood of an attack. Assessing what characteristics of camps and their populations increase the likelihood of an attack should serve as a guide to the implementation and organization of new refugee camps to ensure peace and stability for an already fragile community.

We address the consequences of corruption within a state on the extent to which populations have shortened life expectancy due to political corruption. Using three variables to estimate corruption, the results support the expectation that corruption increases average disability shortened life years (DALY). The results persist when estimating the model including measures of deaths from civil war and the number of bordering states experiencing civil war, both previously shown to have an effect on DALY, although these two variables are not statistically significant in our models. While the estimated effects of the corruption variables continue to capture much of the variation in DALY for a global group of nations, they completely fail to explain any variation in Sub-Saharan African states, probably because of the devastating effects of AIDS and malaria in that region. Finally, we discuss why this failure occurs and discuss the implications of our results.A politician who stays poor is poor at politics.

Since the height of the Cold War, major democratic arms suppliers have claimed that they take into consideration the human rights records of existing and potential purchasing states. After the Cold War, supplier policies suggested an increased focus on matters of human rights. But do their records match their rhetoric and their formal policies? We examine the arms transfer patterns of the four major democratic suppliers between 1976 and 2009. We argue that if practice matches policy, then democratic suppliers should not transfer weapons to states violating human rights. However, because the global interests of these suppliers shift over time, we expect some transfers of major weapon systems to states that violate human rights, but not of the types most implicated in human rights abuses. Thus, we build on the existing arms transfer literature by disaggregating exports based on weapons type. The ordered logits we run for each major democratic supplier from 1976-2009 show that the major democratic suppliers generally do not account for human rights violations in the importing state, with the one exception being the United States transfer of land weapon systems. This research is important not only to arms and human rights research, but to foreign-policy scholars in general. The patterns of supply and the continued preference of states to provide major conventional weapons to states with poor human rights records reveals important policy priorities for these democratic states.