Human Rights and Democratic Arms Transfers: Rhetoric Versus Reality with Different Types of Major Weapon Systems

Abstract

Since the height of the Cold War, major democratic arms suppliers have claimed that they take into consideration the human rights records of existing and potential purchasing states. After the Cold War, supplier policies suggested an increased focus on matters of human rights. But do their records match their rhetoric and their formal policies? We examine the arms transfer patterns of the four major democratic suppliers between 1976 and 2009. We argue that if practice matches policy, then democratic suppliers should not transfer weapons to states violating human rights. However, because the global interests of these suppliers shift over time, we expect some transfers of major weapon systems to states that violate human rights, but not of the types most implicated in human rights abuses. Thus, we build on the existing arms transfer literature by disaggregating exports based on weapons type. The ordered logits we run for each major democratic supplier from 1976-2009 show that the major democratic suppliers generally do not account for human rights violations in the importing state, with the one exception being the United States transfer of land weapon systems. This research is important not only to arms and human rights research, but to foreign-policy scholars in general. The patterns of supply and the continued preference of states to provide major conventional weapons to states with poor human rights records reveals important policy priorities for these democratic states.

Deontological and Consequentialist Preferences Towards Arms Exports -- A Comparative Conjoint Experiment in France and Germany

“…We operationalize the weapon type as weapons with direct physical harm potential (large weapons and small arms) and as weapons with a more indirect use (c.f. Johnson and Willardson 2018). This should also prevent respondents from inferring the weapon type and its harm potential from the monetary value of the deal.…”

“…We also introduce two attributes which serve to test the moderation of economic and moral attributes. On the one hand, this is the weapons type: Norm compliance could be conditional on the type of military equipment to be exported and its potential for offensive or defensive military purposes (Johnson and Willardson 2018). We operationalize the weapon type as weapons with direct physical harm potential (large weapons and small arms) and as weapons with a more indirect use (c.f.…”

The Interwar Period International Trade in Arms (IPITA): A New Dataset

“…Along these lines, existing research uses these data to study how arms imports affect domestic conflict and state repression (Johnson and Willardson, 2018;Mehrl and Thurner, 2020;Moore, 2012;Sullivan et al, 2020;Suzuki, 2007), in what ways weapons transfers influence interstate relations (Beardsley et al, 2020;Krause, 2004), whether arms sales are related to defence spending (Blum, 2019;, and under which conditions countries trade MCW with each other (e.g. Akerman and Seim, 2014;Bove et al, 2018;Comola, 2012;Martínez-Zarzoso and Johannsen, 2019;Thurner et al, 2019;Fritz et al, 2021;Willardson and Johnson, 2022).…”

Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems, 1955–2007

“…While extensive literature examines the supply and demand motivations for arms transfers (e.g. Blanton 1999Blanton , 2005Erickson 2011Erickson , 2015Johnson and Willardson 2018;Kinsella 1994Kinsella , 2002Moore 2012;Platte and Leuffen 2016), the decision to change suppliers is often overlooked. The decision to produce arms is studied (e.g.…”

“…Blanton 2005;Erickson 2011). Even Germany, an industrial supplier with domestic and constitutional law restricting arms exports (Johnson and Willardson 2018), transfer arms to human rights violators (Platte and Leuffen 2016). The dependency threat importers face from industrial suppliers is low, if not nonexistent.…”