Army SRB Program: Estimates of Effects on Retention (Revised and Length of Reenlistment

Tsui, Flora; Hogan, Paul; Chandler, Jeff; Espinosa, Javier; Mackin, Patrick C.; Greenston, Peter M.

doi:10.21236/ada460060

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Furthermore, bonus effects were virtually the same between methods. Tsui et al (2005) reach a similar finding in their study of LOR and Simon et al (forthcoming) find that sample selection bias corrections had little effect on estimates of the effects of GI Bill benefits on GI Bill use. Because sample selection bias corrections were found to have little influence on the estimates, we chose to correct for censoring by using Tobit estimation of the LOR equation and ignore correction for sample selection bias.…”

Section: Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and The Length Of Reenlistmentsupporting

confidence: 69%

“…Such declines are consistent with the fact that bonus ceilings are binding for most personnel when multipliers reach 2.5-3. 32 The estimated effects of SRB multiplier changes on LOR are broadly similar to the effects estimated by Tsui et al (2005) in an analysis of Army LOR and by Hogan and Simonson (2007) in an analysis of Navy LOR. Tsui et al estimate that up to a multipler of 4, each onelevel increase in the SRB multipler raises the length of a reenlistment by about four months.…”

Section: Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and The Length Of Reenlistmentsupporting

confidence: 55%

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Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment

Asch¹,

Heaton²,

Hosek³

et al. 2010

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Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of DefenseApproved for public release; distribution unlimitedThe RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2010 RAND CorporationPermission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002.iii This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments. The report should be of interest to policymakers concerned with military recruiting and retention and to defense manpower researchers.

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Section: Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and The Length Of Reenlistmentsupporting

confidence: 69%

Section: Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and The Length Of Reenlistmentsupporting

confidence: 55%

Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment

Asch¹,

Heaton²,

Hosek³

et al. 2010

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“…Prior to the Tiered SRB program, Zone C personnel were generally offered fewer SRBs than earlier-career individuals (see Figure A.2 for evidence of this in multiple MOSs in our CMFs of interest), presumably because reenlistment rates among Zone C soldiers tend to be very high overall, and these personnel were likely to be increasingly incentivized to reenlist by approaching retirement benefits (Hattiangadi et al, 2004). In past studies on the reenlistment effects of SRBs, Zone C estimates have tended to be much smaller than those for Zones A and B and are sometimes not statistically distinguishable from zero (Hattiangadi et al, 2004;Moore et al, 2007;Tsui et al, 2006). We explore this difference with past programs in more detail below.…”

Section: The Targeted Srb and Location Srb Programsmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…A trio of older studies that focused specifically on Army enlisted personnel in the 1990s found changes in first-term reenlistment rates associated with a one-unit multiplier increase that ranged from approximately 4 to 6 percentage points and second-term effects that ranged from around 1 to 4 percentage points (Hogan et al, 2005;Tsui et al, 2006;Moore et al, 2007). Hogan et al (2005) estimated an association between Zone A reenlistment and a one-multiplier increase of around 4.4 percentage points, and a much smaller 1percentage point increase in Zone B.…”

Section: Percentage Pointsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program

Asch¹,

Mattock²,

Tong³

et al. 2021

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This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Special and Incentive Pays in the Army, sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The purpose of the project was to help the Army determine how to best set special and incentive pays to increase incentives for higher performance and to more efficiently achieve Army recruiting and retention objectives.

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“…Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. The 2005 results are also reproduced inTsui, et al (2007). 2 The other uniformed services are following suit.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Econometric Estimates of Army Retention: Zones A, B, C, D and Retirement-Eligible, 1990-2004

Moore¹,

Hogan²,

Kirchner³

et al. 2007

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Efficient allocation of reenlistment bonuses requires the ability to estimate the effect that the bonus will have on reenlistments in an occupational specialty. Previous research, conducted in developing the SRB Management System, estimated the effects of SRB on Zone A, B and C reenlistment decisions made between FY1990 and FY2000. In this analysis, we extend the years analyzed to include FY2001 through FY2004. The additional years of data include Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). We tested the ability of the existing model to predict reenlistment decision-making post-FY2000. To improve fit, we generated new econometric estimates by MOS, CMF and Zone using the more recent years of data, and conducted out-of-sample prediction testing to confirm the validity of the updated model.

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Army SRB Program: Estimates of Effects on Retention (Revised and Length of Reenlistment

Cited by 3 publications

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Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment

Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment

Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program

Econometric Estimates of Army Retention: Zones A, B, C, D and Retirement-Eligible, 1990-2004

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