ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea

Buszynski, Leszek

doi:10.1355/cs25-3a

Cited by 63 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…In declaring the waters internal, China provided itself with domestic legitimization of provisions for the significant use of force within the sea, including the forced eviction of unfriendly vessels from the entire South China Sea. Alarmed, ASEAN nations responded in turn by assuring China that any encroachment on their sovereign territory would be met with military force (Buszynski 2003). China also further expanded its territorial holdings in the Spratly islands in 1994 with the occupation of Mischief Reef (Fravel 2008, 296).…”

Section: Establishing the Claims And Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The code allowed ASEAN to gain greater regional integration and stability against the prospect of a rising and powerful China, and also allowed China to guard against an intensification of United States influence among ASEAN states seeking a security assurance. While eventually reduced from being a legally binding code, and following controversy around the definition of the disputed area and the prevention of military activity from external states, the Declaration on Conduct was signed by ASEAN and China in November 2002 (Buszynski 2003).…”

Section: Establishing the Claims And Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Constructing Cooperation: Chinese Ontological Security Seeking in the South China Sea Dispute

Curtis¹

2015

Journal of Borderlands Studies

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Chinese actions regarding disputes in the South China Sea have varied between complacence, use of force, and active engagement in attempts to forge cooperative relationships with disputant nations. In this paper, I argue that analysis of China's actions centered on the material and strategic importance of the Sea does not adequately account for the broad changes in China's behavior. Instead, I apply the theory of Ontological Security, arguing that changes in China's behavior in the dispute can best be explained as an attempt by China to maintain security of its national identity. In particular, I argue that China's historical understanding of its self, the expectations that arise from this, and the alignment of South East Asian state's actions with these expectations, inform China's attitude and actions in the dispute.

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Section: Establishing the Claims And Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Establishing the Claims And Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constructing Cooperation: Chinese Ontological Security Seeking in the South China Sea Dispute

Curtis¹

2015

Journal of Borderlands Studies

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“…38 to improve China's image among ASEAN states, which responded quite positively. 43 In March of 1999, China and the Philippines established a 'Working Meeting to Build Trust between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea' , opening a significant channel for the two sides to discuss the South China Sea dispute. 44 From success to failure It is important to note that this period represented a comprehensive improvement in relations, but not a more fundamental resolution of the issue of concern to the parties to the dispute.…”

Section: Initial Successmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking East Asian Regional Order and China's Rise

Sun¹

2013

Japanese Journal of Political Science

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After the end of World War II, East Asia gradually formed what can be referred to as a quasi-anarchical regional order. The quasi-anarchy system is defined by the anarchy system associated with a sub-hierarchical system, so this system possesses the characteristics of both anarchy and hierarchy in terms of security relations among states. The states in a quasi-anarchical order can be differentiated into three types according to the method through which they seek security. They comprise that of self-help states, the state that provides security guarantees to client states (security guarantor), and states that receive security protection from the security guarantor (client states) within the quasi-anarchy. The standard security relationship between states consists of two types: the first is a competitive security relationship; the second is a security-dependent relationship. The quasi-anarchical order in East Asia has restricted the continuance and positive effect of a rising China's reassurance policy through three mechanisms: dependence, reliance on support, and imitation.

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“…In 2002, Chinese goodwill led to the signing of the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues and the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea. The DOC was not quite a real regional code of conduct, as some ASEAN countries had hoped for, but it constituted a step in the right direction (Buszynski 2003 The evolution of Chinese diplomacy towards the ASEAN region from the 1990s to the present has been something to behold. From an initial distrust of multilateralism to becoming a sophisticated multilateralist, China has successfully transformed itself from past revolutionary pariah to present status-quo power.…”

Section: Intensification Of Relations: 2000-08mentioning

confidence: 99%

Rising China: Power and Reassurance

Huisken¹

2009

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ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea

Cited by 63 publications

References 13 publications

Constructing Cooperation: Chinese Ontological Security Seeking in the South China Sea Dispute

Constructing Cooperation: Chinese Ontological Security Seeking in the South China Sea Dispute

Rethinking East Asian Regional Order and China's Rise

Rising China: Power and Reassurance

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