Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character

Price, Richard

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.610.x

Cited by 60 publications

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“…Philosophers have alluded to this alternative before (the first being Price, 2009), but I provide a comprehensive account of the view, show how my account significantly differs from past claims, and offer a novel argument for the view. Finally, I show that my account puts us in a position to provide a new objection to…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception

Connolly

2014

Erkenn

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Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one's attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have alluded to this alternative before, but I provide a comprehensive account of the view, show how my account significantly differs from past claims, and offer a novel argument for the view. Finally, I show that my account puts us in a position to provide a new objection to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception

Connolly

2014

Erkenn

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“…For example, for rejection of the premise equivalent to (2) see Brogaard and Reiland . And for rejection of the premise equivalent to (4) see Briscoe , Brogaard , Nanay , and Price .…”

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On Experiencing Meanings

Reiland¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Do we perceptually experience meanings? For example, when we hear an utterance of a sentence like 'Bertrand is British' do we hear its meaning in the sense of being auditorily aware of it? Several philosophers like Tim Bayne and Susanna Siegel have suggested that we do (Bayne 2009: 390, Siegel 2006: 490-491, 2011. They argue roughly as follows: 1) experiencing speech/writing in a language you are incompetent in is phenomenally different from experiencing speech/ writing you are competent in; 2) this contrast is best explained by the fact that we experience meanings in the latter case, but not the former. In contrast, in an important recent discussion Casey O'Callaghan has argued that we do not (O'Callaghan 2011). He responds to the above contrast argument by claiming that this phenomenal contrast is instead best explained by the fact that we hear language-specific phonological properties in the latter case, but not in the former. In this paper I argue that O'Callaghan's response to the popular contrast argument is too limited in scope, provide a more general response, and present a new case against experiencing meanings.

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“…Of late philosophers of mind have been greatly exercised by a debate about the 'admissible contents of perceptual experience' (e.g., Bayne 2009Bayne , 2016Brogaard 2013a;Carruthers and Veillet 2011;Fish 2013;Hawley and Macpherson 2011;Logue 2013;Lyons 2005;Masrour 2011;McClelland 2016;Nanay 2011;Price 2009;Prinz 2013;Reiland 2014;Siegel 2006Siegel , 2010. The issue, roughly put, concerns the range of properties that 'figure in' perceptual experience.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…After all, ensemble properties do not appear on any of the lists that philosophers of perception provide of those properties that are obviously perceptually admissible (see e.g. Brogaard 2013a, b;Hawley and Macpherson 2011;Logue 2013;Lyons 2005;Masrour 2011;Price 2009;Siegel 2010); indeed, to date ensemble properties have Fig. 2 Example stimuli.…”

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Ensemble representation and the contents of visual experience

Bayne

McClelland

2018

Philos Stud

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The on-going debate over the 'admissible contents of perceptual experience' concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that 'ensemble properties' should be added to the list of visually admissible properties. Ensemble properties are features that belong to a set of perceptible objects as a whole as opposed to the individuals that constitute that set. They include such features as the mean size of an array of shapes or the average emotional expression of an array of faces. Recent work in vision science has yielded compelling evidence that the visual system routinely encodes such properties. We argue that epistemological considerations provide strong reasons to think that these properties figure in visual experience. Judgements about ensemble properties are immediately warranted by our perceptual experience, and the only plausible way that a perceptual experience could confer this warrant is if it confers awareness of ensemble properties.Tim Bayne and Tom McClelland have contributed equally to this paper, and the order of authors has been determined alphabetically.

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Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character

Cited by 60 publications

References 0 publications

Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception

Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception

On Experiencing Meanings

Ensemble representation and the contents of visual experience

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