Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies

Browne, Eric C.; Franklin, Mark N.

doi:10.2307/1958776

Cited by 319 publications

(200 citation statements)

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“…This is not true empirically, a finding first published over 40 years ago. 6 Nonetheless, GL itself has proved extraordinarily robust to replication, even when different cabinet portfolios are assigned very 4 (Bassi 2013;Carroll and Cox 2007a;Laver et al 2011;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) 5 Browne and Franklin 1973;Browne and Frendreis 1980;Fréchette et al 2005b;Gamson 1961;Laver et al 2011;Schofield and Laver 1985;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Snyder et al 2005) different empirical weights. 7 On the other side of the paradox we find canonical alternating offers models of legislative bargaining, with an intellectual pedigree traceable to Rubinstein (1982), adapted to legislative bargaining by Baron and Ferejohn (1989 .…”

Section: The Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second proposition is stated ex post, knowing the identity of the formateur. The propositions are therefore not contradictory because they apply in 7 Browne and Franklin 1973;Browne and Frendreis 1980;Fréchette et al 2005b;Gamson 1961;Laver et al 2011;Schofield and Laver 1985;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Snyder et al 2005) 8 Snyder et al 2005) 9 (Snyder et al 2005: 982) 10 (Snyder et al 2005: 992) different settings, but this highlights a critical distinction between ex ante and ex post models of cabinet portfolio distribution. The paradox is therefore both simple and striking.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Cutler¹,

Marchi²,

Gallop³

et al. 2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se, from the distribution of key government payoffs such as cabinet portfolios between members of the government that forms. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, given knowledge of the identity of some government "formateur" or even of the full partisan composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining, and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations -"Gamson's Law". We resolve this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution, which for example predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post.We conclude that canonical models of legislative bargaining do add to our ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm … we suggest because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 2

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Section: The Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Cutler¹,

Marchi²,

Gallop³

et al. 2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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“…En la distribución de los ministerios la búsqueda de equilibrios se asume en función de la coalescencia, o proporcionalidad, entre el número de cargos asignados a un partido con aquellos que posee al interior del Congreso Nacional. Dicha relación ha sido largamente estudiada en los sistemas parlamentarios (Browne y Franklin, 1973). En cambio, en el marco de los sistemas presidenciales, y sobre todo en los presidencialismos de coalición, se depende de los equilibrios partidarios que asuma el propio presidente.…”

Section: Gráfico 1 Militancia De Los Ministros En Cada Administraciónunclassified

Rotación ministerial y estabilidad coalicional en Chile, 1990-2010

Avendaño

Dávila

2013

Revista Política

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Este artículo analiza el fenómeno de la rotación ministerial durante los cuatro gobiernos de la Concertación, que se sucedieron en el período 1990-2010. Junto con describir la participación de los partidos en la conformación de los gabinetes, se examina el impacto de la rotación para la estabilidad del gobierno y para la coalición de centro-izquierda. La rotación ministerial es entendida como el movimiento de ingreso y salida del gabinete ministerial en el marco de una administración gubernamental. En cuanto a la carrera política la rotación se enmarca en la trayectoria que ciertos individuos asumen con el fin de adquirir experiencia, acumular capital político, y desde luego acceder a cargos de representación. Palabras clave: rotación ministerial, Concertación, gabinetes, Chile.ministerial turnover and coalition stability in chile, 1990 -2010 This paper analyzes ministerial turnover during the four Concertación administrations between 1990 and 2010. In addition to describing party involvement in cabinet formation, we analyze the impact of ministerial turnover on government and coalition stability. Ministerial turnover is defined as the appointment and dismissal of ministers from the cabinet during one administration. In terms of political careers, ministerial turnover is viewed as that aspect of a politician's career trajectory that has the purpose of gaining experience, increasing their political capital and gaining access to elected posts.

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“…This thesis is thus similar to Gamson's Law -the observation that, if a multi-party government forms in a parliamentary system, then each party's share of portfolios will closely reflect its share of seats in the assembly. 20 Both the claim that agenda vetoes are distributed to each pivotal party (the parliamentary cartel thesis) and the claim that portfolios in parliamentary systems are distributed proportionally to seat shares (Gamson's Law) characterise the government bargaining outcomes that emerge in equilibrium. Theoretical models of the government formation process should then accommodate these empirical regularities, to the extent that they are empirically validated.…”

Section: 18mentioning

confidence: 99%

Agenda control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002

2006

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We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties' (and not government parties') roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties skyrocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 per cent leftward under a leftist government. INTRODUCTIONGoverning coalitions in parliamentary democracies are famous for their voting cohesion. Individual MPs rarely dissent from their party's position, coalition partners rarely disagree publicly, and the government's programme thus proceeds through the assembly on the strength of the coalition's numerical superiority -simply outvoting the opposition at every turn.Iron discipline, however, is not a natural phenomenon. The component parties in multiparty coalitions do not agree on all possible issues; they merely agree on all issues actually considered in plenary sessions of the assembly.1 Thus, the high levels of coalition discipline observed in roll call votes are as much a function of governmental agenda control -specifically, the ability of the coalition to prevent bills that would split its members apart from being voted on the floor -as they are of the carrots and sticks that governing parties use to whip their members into line. 2In some polities, such as France's Fifth Republic, 3 the government's ability to control the legislative agenda has clear institutional sources. In this article, we explore agenda setting in Germany, a case in which the government's institutional control of the agenda might be questioned -given the tradition of seeking broad consensus in the Council of Elders (the formal agenda-setting institution in the Bundestag) and the frequency with which the government does not command a majority in the second chamber (the Bundesrat). We argue that the Council of Elders seeks -and is expected by the opposition to seek -only a procedural and not a substantive consensus; that the government is relatively successful at patching together support in the Bundesrat; and thus, that the most likely impediments to governmental agenda

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Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies

Cited by 319 publications

References 5 publications

Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Rotación ministerial y estabilidad coalicional en Chile, 1990-2010

Agenda control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002

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