Aspiration-induced reconnection in spatial public-goods game

Zhang, Haifeng; Liu, Run-Ran; Wang, Zhen; Yang, Huijie; Wang, Bing–Hong

doi:10.1209/0295-5075/94/18006

Cited by 99 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…Inspired by the seminal paper introducing games on grids [18], evolutionary games on graphs and complex networks [19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37] have proven instrumental in raising the awareness of the fact that relaxing the simplification of well-mixed interactions may lead to qualitatively different results that are due to pattern formation and intricate organization of the competing strategies, which reveals itself in most unexpected ways. Specifically for the spatial public goods game [38,39], it has recently been shown that inhomogeneous player activities [40], appropriate partner selection [41,42], diversity [43][44][45], the critical mass [46], heterogeneous wealth distributions [47], the introduction of punishment [48,49] and reward [50], as well as both the joker [51] and the Matthew effect [52], can all substantially promote the evolution of public cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

Szolnoki¹,

Perc²

2012

Phys. Rev. E

156

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The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides unconditional cooperators and defectors, also different types of conditional cooperators compete for space. Conditional cooperators will contribute to the public good only if other players within the group are likely to cooperate as well, but will withhold their contribution otherwise. Depending on the number of other cooperators that are required to elicit cooperation of a conditional cooperator, the latter can be classified in as many types as there are players within each group. We find that the most cautious cooperators, such that require all other players within a group to be conditional cooperators, are the undisputed victors of the evolutionary process, even at very low synergy factors. We show that the remarkable promotion of cooperation is due primarily to the spontaneous emergence of quarantining of defectors, which become surrounded by conditional cooperators and are forced into isolated convex "bubbles" from where they are unable to exploit the public good. This phenomenon can be observed only in structured populations, thus adding to the relevance of pattern formation for the successful evolution of cooperation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

Szolnoki¹,

Perc²

2012

Phys. Rev. E

156

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“…The standard way to realize this objective is to incorporate a stochastic element into the decision updating process. By using the Fermi function that is widely used in the studies of evolutionary game theory [21,[47][48][49][50], the probability of choosing to vaccinate for any individual i is defined as…”

Section: A Vaccination Decision Formation Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of subsidy policies on vaccination decisions in contact networks

Zhang

et al. 2013

Phys. Rev. E

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To motivate more people to participate in vaccination campaigns, various subsidy policies are often supplied by government and the health sectors. However, these external incentives may also alter the vaccination decisions of the broader public, and hence the choice of incentive needs to be carefully considered. Since human behavior and the networking-constrained interactions among individuals significantly impact the evolution of an epidemic, here we consider the voluntary vaccination on human contact networks. To this end, two categories of typical subsidy policies are considered: (1) under the free subsidy policy, the total amount of subsidy is distributed to a certain fraction of individual and who are vaccinated without personal cost, and (2) under the partial-offset subsidy policy, each vaccinated person is offset by a certain amount of subsidy. A vaccination decision model based on evolutionary game theory is established to study the effects of these different subsidy policies on disease control. Simulations suggest that, because the partial-offset subsidy policy encourages more people to take vaccination, its performance is significantly better than that of the free subsidy policy. However, an interesting phenomenon emerges in the partial-offset scenario: with limited amount of total subsidy, a moderate subsidy rate for each vaccinated individual can guarantee the group-optimal vaccination, leading to the maximal social benefits, while such an optimal phenomenon is not evident for the free subsidy scenario.

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“…After each time step, player x can reassess and imitate one of the more successful neighbor's strategies by comparing his/her payoff with that of a randomly selected neighbor y. Following previous studies [11][12][13][14]22,[33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40], player x can follow the strategy of a randomly selected neighbor y with the probability depending on the payoff difference (P x P y ):…”

Section: The Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Notably, increasing the number of neighbors n has a favorable effect on defection [35][36][37][38][39][40]. Our goal is to explore whether the effect of the size of the neighborhood n is beneficial for the maintenance of cooperation.…”

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confidence: 99%

Spatial prisoner’s dilemma games with increasing size of the interaction neighborhood on regular lattices

et al. 2012

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We studied the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where the size of the interaction neighborhood is considered. Firstly, the effects of noise and the cost-to-benefit ratio on the maintenance of cooperation were investigated. The results indicate that the cooperation frequency depends on the noise and cost-to-benefit ratio: cooperation reaches a climax as noise increases, but it monotonously decreases and even vanishes with the ratio increasing. Furthermore, we investigated how the size of the interaction neighborhood affects the emergence of cooperation in detail. Our study demonstrates that cooperation is remarkably enhanced by an increase in the size of the interaction neighborhood. However, cooperation died out when the size of the interaction neighborhood became too large since the system was similar to the mean-field system. On this basis, a cluster-forming mechanism acting among cooperators was also explored, and it showed that the moderate range of the neighborhood size is beneficial for forming larger cooperative clusters. Finally, large-scale Monte Carlo simulations were carried out to visualize and interpret these phenomena explicitly. [11][12][13][14][15][16]. As a paradigm of pair-wise interaction games, the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) has attracted much attention [17][18][19][20][21]. In the original form of the PDG, there are two behavior options: each of two players must simultaneously choose to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). If both players choose C, they will receive the reward R separately, but only the punishment P for mutual defection. If two players take different strategies, then the defector will get the highest payoff of temptation T, while the cooperator will be left with the lowest sucker's payoff S. These payoffs usually satisfy the elementary payoff ranking T > R > P > S and the additional required condition (T + S) < 2R in repeated interactions. Henceforth, defection is the optimal choice for each player irrespective of the decision of his opponent, and defection will become widespread. Every player will end up with the payoff P instead of the payoff R, which yields the social dilemmas as depicted in [22]. According to the motivation of the non-equilibrium kinetic Ising model in statistical physics, the PDG has been well studied for a spatially structured population in past decades [11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]. In these models, players are distributed at the sites of different lattices or graphs, and each player can update his/her strategy and has a given probability of adopting his/her neighbor's strategies at each time step. Recently, many real systems have been found to exhibit

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Aspiration-induced reconnection in spatial public-goods game

Cited by 99 publications

References 67 publications

Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

Impacts of subsidy policies on vaccination decisions in contact networks

Spatial prisoner’s dilemma games with increasing size of the interaction neighborhood on regular lattices

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