Assertion and its Constitutive Norms

Abstract

Alston, Searle, and Williamson advocate the restrictive model of assertion, according to which certain constitutive assertoric norms restrict which propositions one may assert. Sellars and Brandom advocate the dialectical model of assertion, which treats assertion as constituted by its role in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Sellars and Brandom develop a restrictive version of the dialectical model. I explore a non-restrictive version of the dialectical model. On such a view, constitutive assertoric norms constrain how one must react if an interlocutor challenges one's assertion, but they do not constrain what one should assert in the first place. I argue that the non-restrictive dialectical perspective can accommodate various linguistic phenomena commonly taken to support the restrictive model. 1

The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

“…They want to know what rule or rules help constitute the practice of assertion, make that form of activity possible. They are interested in constitutive normativity (Brandom, 1983;Rescorla, 2009;Searle, 1969Searle, , 1979. Constitutive norms or rules are internal to and distinctive of a practice.…”

Knowledge and suberogatory assertion

“…Similarly not all dialectical accounts are purely ex post facto accounts. For instance, on Rescorla's (2009, p. 100) reading, Brandom (1994 advocates a mixed account, which also accepts a concurrent restriction on assertion, to the effect that you may assert P only if you have sufficient warrant to believe P. On this interpretation, Brandom accepts Ex Post Facto and Plurality. 9 Sometimes it is said that we are entitled to 'resent' such an assertion (Williamson 2000, p. 246;Turri 2011a;compare Weiner 2005).…”

“…Call these ex post facto dialectical accounts. On the most natural way of developing this view, the norm of assertion stipulates how you must respond if your assertion is challenged, rather than placing prior restraint on what you may assert initially (Rescorla 2009). An ex post facto dialectical account might endorse…”

The Norms of Assertion

“…At this point we can make an important distinction between practices and mere activities. Michael Rescorla (2009) argues that, "Every practice is associated with 'internal' standards of normative assessment codified by norms dictating how to execute the practice correctly" (2009, p. 101). An agent may violate such norms, however, and still be engaging in the practice: "A devious gambler might repeatedly cheat during a poker game.…”