Knowledge and suberogatory assertion

Turri, John

doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0112-z

Cited by 53 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…These observations suggest an important normative connection between what you know and what you should assert (for overviews see Benton 2012;Turri 2014; for earlier relevant work, see Unger 1975;Williamson 2000). Consider just three of the most suggestive clues.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test

Turri

2014

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An impressive case has been built for the hypothesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion, otherwise known as the knowledge account of assertion. According to the knowledge account, you should assert something only if you know that it's true. A wealth of observational data supports the knowledge account, and some recent empirical results lend further, indirect support. But the knowledge account has not yet been tested directly. This paper fills that gap by reporting the results of such a test. The knowledge account passes with flying colors.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test

Turri

2014

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“…These data have acted as a leash, fruitfully constraining as well as inspiring the theoretical debate. But it's quite a long leash (Turri, 2013). It would be useful to add to our data set relevant observations tempered by proper controls.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

Turri

2013

Cognition

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a b s t r a c tAssertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. Philosophers have recently built an impressive case that the norm of assertion is factive. That is, you should make an assertion only if it is true. Thus far the case for a factive norm of assertion been based on observational data. This paper adds experimental evidence in favor of a factive norm from six studies. In these studies, an assertion's truth value dramatically affects whether people think it should be made. Whereas nearly everyone agreed that a true assertion supported by good evidence should be made, most people judged that a false assertion supported by good evidence should not be made. The studies also suggest that people are consciously aware of criteria that guide their evaluation of assertions. Evidence is also presented that some intuitive support for a non-factive norm of assertion comes from a surprising tendency people have to misdescribe cases of blameless rule-breaking as cases where no rule is broken.

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“…31 Cf. Turri (2014) who suggests that the uniqueness assumption may be rejected in favour of what he calls a pluralist axiological knowledge account of assertion (which is nevertheless, a knowledge norm of assertion). I am directing the challenge for sufficiency, as developed here, against what Turri himself rejects under the description of the simple version of the knowledge norm (Turri 2014, p. 558), which is also the standard way of thinking of the knowledge norm.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy

Carter

2015

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This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice.

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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion

Cited by 53 publications

References 41 publications

Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test

Knowledge and the norm of assertion: a simple test

The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy

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