Assessing Leader Credibility during a Peace Process: Rabin's Private Polls

Auerbach, Yehudith; Greenbaum, Charles W.

doi:10.1177/0022343300037001002

Cited by 16 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…To the very end, he disliked working with PLO leader Yasser Arafat; but he argued that the decision, however personally abhorrent, was necessary in the interests of Israel itself (see Sasley 2010:699–701). Although this was clearly his own decision, nonetheless, Rabin’s considerations fits with a public opinion that was increasingly “dovish” and overcoming its long aversion to compromise with the Palestinians, in the context of negotiations and some resolution to the conflict (Auerbach and Greenbaum 2000; Sucharov 2005). It also fit with a growing leftward drift within his own political‐institutional home, the Labor Party, which began to feel that in the interests of peace the time had come to consider real concessions toward the Palestinians, even the PLO (Inbar 1991).…”

Section: Thinking Of States‐as‐groups With Emotionsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Theorizing States’ Emotions1

Sasley

2011

International Studies Review

172

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This article starts from the assumption that emotions are inherently part of life in the international system, but that this is not as well reflected in the discipline of International Relations. The study of emotions can be incorporated more systematically into the discipline through more rigorous theorizing about how states-as main actors in world politicsexperience and act on emotions. To do so, I draw on intergroup emotions theory, an emerging area of research in social psychology. This approach points out the process by which groups come to have emotional reactions, and from there how emotions generate intergroup perceptions and intergroup behavior-or foreign policies in the case of states. Understanding states-as-groups addresses many of the criticisms mainstream IR scholars direct toward the study of emotions, including how individual-level factors such as emotions matter for intergroup relationships.1 I would like to thank the following people for reading earlier drafts of the paper and facilitating a sharpening of the argument: Widmaier. Exchanges with Andrew Ross helped me better understand the relationship between constructivism and emotions. Positive and constructive comments from three anonymous reviewers, as well as helpful discussions with the editors, improved the presentation of the argument.

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Section: Thinking Of States‐as‐groups With Emotionsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Theorizing States’ Emotions1

Sasley

2011

International Studies Review

172

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“…In the lead-up to Operation Accountability, Rabin came under fire for compromising with Syria on the Golan Heights and showing flexibility toward the Palestinians. According to a private opinion poll that Rabin initiated in May 1993, a majority viewed Rabin’s handling of negotiations with the Palestinians as too “soft.” As Auerbach and Greenbaum (2000, 49) write, “In view of the data that suggested people’s distrust in Rabin’s ability to maintain security and effectively conduct negotiations, he could either halt the fast movement toward agreement with the PLO, or he could take a dramatic decision in order to recover his credibility as a tough and trustworthy leader. Rabin opted for the second alternative.” Others suggest thatA show of force was seen as a way to ward off domestic criticism of government policy.…”

Section: Illustrative Crisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although there is little indication that negotiations with Hezbollah were possible, given this public framing of the circumstances, a restrained response to the attacks would have been domestically toxic for Rabin. The operation succeeded in restoring Rabin’s public image (Auerbach and Greenbaum 2000, 49). Asked whether the operation was successful, 81 percent said yes; asked whether one could “trust Rabin’s judgment concerning security and political issues” in light of Operation Accountability and other policies over the past year, 64 percent responded positively.…”

Section: Illustrative Crisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining

Debs

Weiss

2014

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country’s resolve is a function of intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown by the domestic electorate and the foreign country. When domestic political debate reveals that circumstances favor the use of force, the government can extract better terms than if circumstances are revealed to be unfavorable. The revelation of circumstances, however, exacerbates reputational incentives. Because governments can no longer hide behind unknown circumstances, voters can better discern the government’s type from its actions, strengthening the incentives to appear resolved. The model bridges the gap between audience costs and its critiques, showing how domestic audiences punish leaders for inappropriate policies rather than empty threats. At the same time, it highlights how the prospects for peace are worse if uncertainty about the circumstances is removed, suggesting that greater transparency does not always promote peaceful outcomes.

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“…However, Rabin decided to break away from the state's traditional position and negotiate directly with the PLO only after the 1992 elections (Arian 2005: 416). If the public opinion related to peace as a favorable option -and Rabin used public opinion surveys as a policy tool (Auerbach and Greenbaum 2000) -why did Rabin not campaign on this theme? Th us, the Shamir and Shamir account can explain why there were peace talks, but not the surprising turn in Rabin's stance towards making peace with the PLO.…”

Section: Th E Puzzle: Why Did Rabin Decide To Make Peace With the Plomentioning

confidence: 99%

Israel's 1993 Decision to Make Peace with the PLO or How Political Losers (this Time) Became Winners

Doron

Rosenthal

2009

Int Negot

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Political losers' theory claims that political losers can move to a winning position if they turn the tables and change the situation completely. Our analysis shows that political losers can become winners by maintaining their favored option on the agenda. If the alternatives promoted by the political winners collapse and the losers have access to the winners' agenda, then there can be a situation in which the losers' favored alternative might be adopted. Th e 1993 Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) illustrates this. We show how a team of political losers facilitated an alternative that the political winner -Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin -eventually had to adopt when his more favored options for negotiations became irrelevant. Th us, this narrative off ers a complementary explanation to existing explanations of the Oslo Agreement, applies political losers' theory and provides further insight into the infl uence of domestic politics on international negotiations.

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Assessing Leader Credibility during a Peace Process: Rabin's Private Polls

Cited by 16 publications

References 7 publications

Theorizing States’ Emotions1

Theorizing States’ Emotions1

Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining

Israel's 1993 Decision to Make Peace with the PLO or How Political Losers (this Time) Became Winners

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