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This study assesses the role of the press in shaping US foreign policy towards an international crisis. It explores the scope of attention, positions, and metaframes used by the Washington Post and New York Times, as well as the US administration’s announcements, in relation to the Bosnian crisis in its different stages. It is suggested that by discerning and highlighting core US interests and values threatened by the developments in Bosnia – that is, using mainly critical positions and emphasizing humanitarian and security metaframes – the elite press may have pushed the Clinton administration to a more active policy in this crisis. With respect to the differences between the two newspapers, it is found that while both papers expressed criticism of government policy, the Washington Post was much more critical than the New York Times. The main differences between the two papers were in the divergent positions adopted and the different metaframes employed in presenting their respective positions. The central metaframe used by the Washington Post was humanitarian, while the New York Times used primarily frames linked to security and world order. It appears that these two elite papers took upon themselves a dual role in the Bosnia crisis. On the one hand, they served as ‘watchdog’ over the administration’s behavior – expressing criticism and recommending policy; on the other hand, by using meaningful and familiar metaphors, they played an important explanatory role in the realm of public opinion. Examining the role of the elite press in the Bosnia crisis from a combined perspective of Communication and International Relations studies points to the possibility that besides its other roles, the press may contribute to transforming a crisis from a macro-systemic crisis, hardly noted by the decisionmakers, into a micro-perceptional crisis, receiving higher priority from them.

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This article examines the role of public opinion surveys in the making of turning-point decisions (TPDs) that lead to peace between enemies. We present hitherto unpublished data from private polls prepared for Yitzhak Rabin in order to gauge public opinion regarding the Oslo peace process. In analyzing these data we suggest a theoretical model that outlines the role of public opinion in policymaking. The model considers Holsti's (1996) four major parameters within the pre-Oslo framework: the issue facing the decisionmaker; the decisionmaker's beliefs in and sensitivity to public opinion; the political and social context of the decision; and the stage of policymaking. We find support for propositions regarding a paradoxical process characterizing Rabin's policy. Rabin used public opinion polls to gauge the public's support for him as a leader and for taking hawkish decisions, termed credibilitybuilding decisions (CBD). These decisions, though seemingly detrimental to the peace process, were perceived as necessary in order to maintain Rabin's image as a tough-minded leader who would bring peace with the Palestinians without sacrificing security. We suggest that public opinion surveys may be important in monitoring the effects of CBDs on the credibility of a leader whose goal is to move a peace process forward in a time of uncertainty and threat. Leaders and Public OpinionHow does a leader who is determined to build and maintain a framework for peace relate to public opinion? In this article we present an approach to answering this question. We use the analytical framework developed by Holsti (1996) for assessing the relation between public opinion surveys and the process of making turning-point decisions. We extend Holsti's ideas by suggesting a model of the interaction process between leader and public opinion in the context of turning-point decisionmaking. The propositions drawn from the model were tested in the case of the decisionmaking process involving Yitzhak Rabin, the late former Prime Minister of Israel, which led to the Oslo Agreement. We chose this example mainly because of the importance of the Oslo Agreement. The decision to recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians can be seen as a genuine turning-point decision (TPD). It deviated significantly from previous decisions on that issue and involved conspicuous shifts in policy regarding the Palestinian issue. This