Associative foundation of causal learning in rats

Abstract

Are humans unique in their ability to interpret exogenous events as causes? We addressed this question by observing the behavior of rats for indications of causal learning. Within an operant motor-sensory preconditioning paradigm, associative surgical techniques revealed that rats attempted to control an outcome (i.e., a potential effect) by manipulating a potential exogenous cause (i.e., an intervention). Rats were able to generate an innocuous auditory stimulus. This stimulus was then paired with an aversive stimulus. The animals subsequently avoided potential generation of the predictive cue, but not if the aversive stimulus was subsequently devalued or the predictive cue was extinguished (Exp. 1). In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that the aversive stimulus we used was in fact aversive, that it was subject to devaluation, that the cue-aversive stimulus pairings did make the cue a conditioned stimulus, and that the cue was subject to extinction. In Experiments 3 and 4, we established that the decrease in leverpressing observed in Experiment 1 was goal-directed instrumental behavior rather than purely a product of Pavlovian conditioning. To the extent that interventions suggest causal reasoning, it appears that causal reasoning can be based on associations between contiguous exogenous events. Thus, contiguity appears capable of establishing causal relationships between exogenous events. Our results challenge the widely held view that causal learning is uniquely human, and suggest that causal learning is explicable in an associative framework.Keywords Causal learning . Operant behavior . Causal intervention . Manipulability theory . Associative learning . Sensory preconditioningThe world is malleable and, to survive and reproduce, organisms must learn how and under what conditions their actions will control exogenous events. Causal learning facilitates successful interactions with the environment, such as throwing a switch to illuminate a dark room or pressing a lever to receive food. Actions are commonly viewed as causes of contingent consequences (i.e., outcomes). Provided that there is concordance between the contingent outcome and the subject's motivational state, the probability of the action is widely viewed as reflecting the extent to which the action is perceived as a cause of the outcome. But the basis for concluding that there is a causal relationship between two exogenous events is less clear. In situations in which two events are merely correlated, performing an action to produce one event when the other event is desired would be wasted energy. Thus, distinguishing a cause-effect relationship from mere correlation is critical. The scientific identification of two events as cause and effect is formalized using well-designed experiments; however, individuals outside the laboratory quickly infer causal relationships without such rigor. Even researchers, at some level, must suspect a causal relationship based on mere correlation in order to decide whether it is worth testing a particular manipul...

The Comparative Study of Learning from 1994-2013

“…Although by no means a new question, the publication of Blaisdell et al's controversial article in Science (2006) on causal reasoning in rats prompted widespread proliferation of research on related questions, growing substantially from virtually 0% in the first 5 year period to roughly 10% in the most recent 5 years (see Figure 2b). The general question here is whether dissociable mechanisms exist for implicit conditioning and explicit causal or propositional reasoning, and how widespread the latter is across species (Dwyer, Starns, & Honey, 2009;Polack, McConnell, & Miller, 2013;Simms, McCormack, & Beckers, 2012). One central issue is whether apparent causal reasoning, in humans or in nonhuman animals, can be parsimoniously explained using simple associative models such as the Pearce (Pearce, 2002) or Rescorla-Wagner (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) models of learning (Dwyer et al, 2009;Polack et al, 2013;Simms et al, 2012).…”

Sources of maladaptive behavior in ‘normal’ organisms

“…But when nonhumans make similarly optimal choices, many researchers are inclined to talk about the underlying ‘automatic’ behavioral principles at work without appealing to any sort of conscious reasoning as is implied by rationality . The tendency for researchers to provide different accounts of similarly adaptive or maladaptive behaviors seen in humans and nonhumans is likely fueled by our introspecting about our own behaviors (see Polack, McConnell, & Miller, 2013, for a discussion of this issue with respect causal reasoning). Here we will regard so-called conscious reasoning as either (a) an emergent property of underlying behavioral principles (i.e., a different level of analysis rather than an alternative account), or (b) basically epiphenomenal with respect to behavioral choice.…”

Intervening to learn about effects of one’s actions

“…Other studies with rats pressing levers have been phrased in terms of intervention, but there is variety to how intervention has been conceptualized, and to its assumed significance to learning. For instance, Polack, McConnell, and Miller (2013) "assumed that changes in operant responding consistent with the subject's motivation reflected goal-directed behavior, which [they] equated with intervention, and therefore constituted behavior indicative of causal knowledge" (p. 27-28). This approach has had a very influential precedent in the thinking of Shanks and Dickinson (e.g., 1991;Dickinson, 2001).…”

“…This approach has had a very influential precedent in the thinking of Shanks and Dickinson (e.g., 1991;Dickinson, 2001). Polack et al (2013) showed that instrumental responding tracks outcome devaluation (e.g., Adams & Dickinson, 1981) with an aversive stimulus. However, granting their assumption circumvents the questions about intervention the present study attempts to address.…”