2008
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1311324
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Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions

Abstract: Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed participant is known to be active, uninformed bidders will be more aggressive and the selling price will be higher. We conjecture that observable family links between buyer and seller entailed superior information and find a strong price premium when a related buyer pur… Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(34 citation statements)
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“…Thus, moral hazard may itself produce the positive coverage–risk correlation that adverse selection may be expected to produce. Accordingly, although the finding of such a correlation is consistent with adverse selection, it is also consistent with, and may be fully due to, moral hazard, as Dionne, St‐Amour, and Vencatachellum (Forthcoming) stress. We discuss empirical attempts to disentangle adverse section and moral hazard in the section “.”…”
supporting
confidence: 55%
“…Thus, moral hazard may itself produce the positive coverage–risk correlation that adverse selection may be expected to produce. Accordingly, although the finding of such a correlation is consistent with adverse selection, it is also consistent with, and may be fully due to, moral hazard, as Dionne, St‐Amour, and Vencatachellum (Forthcoming) stress. We discuss empirical attempts to disentangle adverse section and moral hazard in the section “.”…”
supporting
confidence: 55%
“…Dionne et al. () extend the empirical model developed by Hong and Shum () and derive the empirical implications of the presence of an informed participant in an English auction with private and common value. In their model, the informed player makes an overall valuation because the common value cannot be distinguished from the private value.…”
Section: Acquisitions and Information Asymmetrymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Dionne et al. () conclude that the presence of an informed participant prompts more aggressive offers by uninformed players. They test their theoretical predictions on a sample of slave auctions in Mauritius between 1825 and 1834.…”
Section: Acquisitions and Information Asymmetrymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The presence of the variable is not necessarily exogenous in equation (1). It is often better to instrument this variable (See Dionne et al, 2009, and Rowell, 2011, for more details).…”
Section: General Tests For Residual Asymmetric Informationmentioning
confidence: 99%