Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed participant is known to be active, uninformed bidders will be more aggressive and the selling price will be higher. We conjecture that observable family links between buyer and seller entailed superior information and find a strong price premium when a related buyer purchased a slave, indicative of information asymmetry. We then test for adverse selection using sale motivation. Our results indicate large discounts on voluntary as compared to involuntary sales. Consistent with adverse selection, the market anticipated that predominantly low-productivity slaves would be brought to the market in voluntary sales. JEL Classification: D 82, N 37

Education, Intergenerational mobility, South Africa, I21, J24,

No abstract

In June 2005 the G8 proposed the Multilateral Debt Relief

The financial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 took a heavy toll on the South African economy. The economy contracted for the first time since 1998 and entered recession during the fourth quarter of 2008. The gross domestic product contraction was soon transmitted to the labour market. Between the second quarters of 2008 and 2009, employment fell by 3.8%.However, not all individuals were hit with the same intensity. Using panel data from a quarterly labour force survey unique in the African context, we find that human capital (i.e. education as years of schooling and workforce experience) provided a buffer against the shock. After controlling for observable characteristics, education and experience showed the potential to entirely offset the effect of the recession on the likelihood of employment. This has important policy implications, as it strengthens the case for strategic investments in human capital and helps identify the unskilled as having the greatest need for social safety net interventions during a recession. JEL Classification: J2, E3