2010
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1711022
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Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: Anything Goes

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Cited by 22 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Garcia and Strobl (2011) study how relative wealth concerns affect investors' incentives to acquire information. Veronesi (2000, 2008) and Breon-Drish (2011) generate strategic complementarities with non-normally distributed asset payoff structures. Our paper proposes a different mechanism for strategic complementarities in financial markets-namely that traders, who have related pieces of information but have different investment opportunity sets, may wish to trade an asset in different directions, thereby reducing price informativeness.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Garcia and Strobl (2011) study how relative wealth concerns affect investors' incentives to acquire information. Veronesi (2000, 2008) and Breon-Drish (2011) generate strategic complementarities with non-normally distributed asset payoff structures. Our paper proposes a different mechanism for strategic complementarities in financial markets-namely that traders, who have related pieces of information but have different investment opportunity sets, may wish to trade an asset in different directions, thereby reducing price informativeness.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, in the standard setting of Grossman and Stiglitz [23], there is never complementarity in information acquisition. Breon-Drish [7], however, shows that a relaxation of the normality assumption of Grossman and Stiglitz can, under some additional conditions, lead to strategic complementarity in information acquisition in a standard central-market rational expectations equilibrium. They show that such equilibria are unstable whenever there is strategic complementarity in information acquisition.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, the information type of a collection of signals is one-toone with the conditional probability that Y = 0 given the signals. 7 More precisely, there is a continuum of signals, indexed by a non-atomic measure space, say [0, 1]. More generally, we will use the following result from Duffie and Manso [12].…”
Section: Information Settingmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Finally, our model contributes to the literature studying sources of strategic complementarities in financial markets, by highlighting a different mechanism by which such complementarities arise. Other papers in this literature include: Barlevy and Veronesi (2000), Ganguli and Yang (2009), Garcia and Strobl (2010), Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2010), Mele andSangiorgi (2010), andBreon-Drish (2011).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%