Asymmetric Power: Negotiating Water in the Euphrates and Tigris

Abstract

This article addresses the conflict over the Euphrates and Tigris waters from the perspective of negotiation theories, by examining the role of power in upstream/downstream negotiations. Conceptual and empirical links are established between water, negotiation (structure, process), power (asymmetries, coalition dynamics, strategies, development of alternatives) and security (direct/indirect interests such as national security, border security, territorial claims, economic development and environmental concerns). The study concludes that asymmetries in power have favored upstream/downstream interactions towards bilateral if not basin-wide arrangements. The framework shows that traditional elements of power, such as upstream positions, military and economic resources, do not constitute the only sources of power. Bargaining power can also determine the dynamics between respective riparians. Time constitutes an important source of power, and interests vary over time when political settings and security concerns shift. Downstream or more vulnerable riparians can invert situations of power asymmetry by acting on the basin-dominant riparian's interests and thus reduce its alternatives. Syria's use of 'issue-linkage' in its interactions with Turkey over water and wider security issues serves as the primary example.

Dynamic political contexts and power asymmetries: the cases of the Blue Nile and the Yarmouk Rivers

“…Cascão (2009) argues that non-hegemonic countries can challenge the hegemonic configuration by using (mainly) soft power, known in the FHH as bargaining and ideational power, in order to shift dominant ideas. Issues linkages to gain more bargaining power or the ''boomerang strategy,'' based on connections with international actors in order to put pressure on riparian states, are some counter-hegemonic tactics that aims at challenging the status quo (Fischer 1981;Keck and Sikkink 2002;Daoudy 2009). …”

“…The participation of these two countries to the negotiating table is likely to have occurred with the final goal of keeping Egyptian traditional influence and compliance-producing mechanisms 11 over the other states involved, in order to procrastinate the adoption of a comprehensive agreement where the reallocation of Nile quotas could erode the ''acquired rights'' of the downstream countries. As argued by Daoudy (2008), this strategy of ''active stalling'' is a conventional tool commonly used by hydrohegemons in order to oppose possible challenges to the status quo (Daoudy 2008(Daoudy , 2009). …”

Transboundary water interaction III: contest and compliance

“…Dinar 2000;Daoudy 2009;Dinar 2009;Kehl 2011;Brochmann 2012;Warner and Zawahri 2012). However, Zeitoun and Jägerskog (2011) have considered how various transboundary water initiatives address asymmetry-and thus might maintain or transform inequitable structures-by influencing or challenging power (Table 1).…”

Where is the power? Transnational networks, authority and the dispute over the Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong Mainstream

“…Zeitoun and Warner (2006) developed their hydro-hegemony model to argue that hegemony can have beneficial as well as detrimental effects depending on the strategies of hegemons. Daoudy (2009) pointed out that power asymmetries can lead to bilateral and basin-wide arrangements as traditional sources of power -geographic position, military and economic resources -may be less important than other sources such as bargaining and issue-linkage used by disadvantaged states. Similarly, Dinar (2009) explained that weaker states have the capacity to influence the hydro-political context; and Kuenzer et al (2013) argued that upstreamdownstream conflicts are subject to complex power plays that determine the distribution of hydropower costs and benefits.…”