Attention and the evolution of intentional communication

Abstract

ABSTRACT.Intentional communication is perceptually based and about attentional objects. Three attention mechanisms are distinguished: scanning, attention attraction, and attentionfocusing. Attention-focusing directs the subject towards attentional objects. Attentionfocusing is goal-governed (controlled by stimulus) or goal-intended (under the control of the subject). Attentional objects are perceptually categorised functional entities that emerge in the interaction between subjects and environment. Joint attention allows for focusing on the same attentional object simultaneously (mutual object-focused attention), provided that the subjects have focused on each other beforehand (subjectsubject attention). It results in intentional communication if the subjects attend to each other as subjects (i) capable of attending, and (ii) attending in a goal-intended way. Intentional communication is fundamentally imperative and adapted to action.

The Archaeology of Teaching and the Evolution ofHomo docens

“…Pointing is naturally combined with evaluative feedback, for example, a parent with a fearful expression on his or her face pointing to a nearby snake. This combination has been called emotive declarative pointing (Brinck 2001;Gärdenfors and Warglien 2013), or expressive declarative pointing (Tomasello, Carpenter, and Liszkowski 2007). The main benefit for the learner of such an exchange is that he or she can learn about the values of objects vicariously.…”

“…Imperative pointing is performed in order to make the attendant do something for the pointer, for example, a chimpanzee indicating where on its body it wants to be groomed (Pika and Mitani 2006). Declarative pointing involves directing the attention of the attendant toward a focal object, for example, an infant pointing to an interesting object to obtain its mother's evaluation of the object (Brinck 2004;Tomasello, Carpenter, and Liszkowski 2007). Pointing is naturally combined with evaluative feedback, for example, a parent with a fearful expression on his or her face pointing to a nearby snake.…”

Social signals: from theory to applications

“…Opposed to this is the perspective of intersubjectivity, according to which social interaction is made possible since the very first days for a human child by an inborn capacity for ''the sharing of experiences'' between two humans; this includes the sharing of emotion, attention, and intention (Brinck 2001) and is seen as preceding, not following, the capacities for figuring out the other's standpoint. Hence, making up a theory of mind of the other is S390 Cogn Process (2012) 13 (Suppl 2):S389-S396 not considered, in this view, as a precondition or an ancestor of the ''shared mind'' (Zlatev et al, 2008).…”

Co–operation and Communication in Apes and Humans

“…This means that attention-focusing may be guided by the agents' mutual attention to each other, instead of by what is happening around them. Thus the agents can attend in a goalintended way (Brinck, 2001). Goal-intention provides for the capacity to either direct or follow the attention of the other subjects in the absence of salient objects (though not in the absence of objects altogether).…”

“…Consequently, for the co-operation to be successful in such cases the agents must engage in joint attention. Joint attention allows for two or more subjects to focus their perception simultaneously on a single object, provided that the subjects have focused on one another's attentional states beforehand (Bruner, 1998;Tomasello, 1999;Brinck, 2001). Joint attention is triadic; the agents do not only attend to a shared object, but also to the attention of each other.…”