Attitude Problems

Abstract

Ascriptions of mental states to oneself and others give rise to many interesting logical and semantic problems. This problem presents an original account of mental state ascriptions that are made using intensional transitive verbs such as ‘want’, ‘seek’, ‘imaginer’, and ‘worship’. This book offers a theory of how such verbs work that draws on ideas from natural language semantics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics.

The Problem of Nonexistence: Truthmaking or Semantics? Critical Notice of The Objects of Thought, by Tim Crane

“…Whether, ultimately, this approach can be sustained to defend NFL is not clear, but it is only by investigating the logical forms of sentences that we can find out. In any case, this approach, which takes characterizing as primitive (see Forbes 2006) seems to fit well with Crane's (2013: 90) proposal to take intentionality as primitive.…”

Explaining Fictional Characters

“…A more complicated example of a similar sort is provided by the fact that 21. Zoltán Szabo (2003) and Graeme Forbes (2006) criticise propositionalism. See also Crane (2008) for a discussion of Sainsbury's conception of 'thinking about' and its evolution.…”

Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience

“…In addition to existence neutrality, two other "marks of intensionality" are often recognized: referential opacity and non-specificity. However, the three "marks of intensionality" come apart in many ways(Coburn 1977;Forbes, 2006Forbes, , 2008Forbes, , 2002, so it is best to choose one mark as definitional. I choose existence-neutrality because it is most relevant to my arguments.4 See footnote 1.…”