Attribution of intentional agency towards robots reduces one’s own sense of agency

Ciardo, Francesca; Beyer, Frederike; Tommaso, Davide De; Wykowska, Agnieszka

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104109

Cited by 55 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Taken together with Grynszpan et al' (2019) findings, it suggests Sense of Agency effects in human-computer interaction are not always driven by the agentic status of the other (i.e. top-down processes), but also bottom-up sensory feedback or increased cognitive workload (Ciardo et al, 2020;Ciardo et al, 2018).…”

Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 70%

“…Conversely, diminishing Social Agency effects from interacting with robots mirror those found in human interaction (e.g. interfered agency; Ciardo, Beyer, De Tommaso, & Wykowska, 2020;Ciardo, De Tommaso, Beyer & Wykowska, 2018). Taken together with Grynszpan et al' (2019) findings, it suggests Sense of Agency effects in human-computer interaction are not always driven by the agentic status of the other (i.e.…”

Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 75%

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Social Agency as a continuum

et al. 2020

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Sense of Agency, the phenomenology associated with causing one’s own actions and corresponding effects, is a cornerstone of human experience. Social Agency can be defined as the Sense of Agency experienced in any situation in which the effects of our actions are related to a conspecific. This can be implemented as the other’s reactions being caused by our action, joint action modulating our Sense of Agency, or the other’s mere social presence influencing our Sense of Agency. It is currently an open question how such Social Agency can be conceptualized and how it relates to its nonsocial variant. This is because, compared with nonsocial Sense of Agency, the concept of Social Agency has remained oversimplified and underresearched, with disparate empirical paradigms yielding divergent results. Reviewing the empirical evidence and the commonalities and differences between different instantiations of Social Agency, we propose that Social Agency can be conceptualized as a continuum, in which the degree of cooperation is the key dimension that determines our Sense of Agency, and how it relates to nonsocial Sense of Agency. Taking this perspective, we review how the different factors that typically influence Sense of Agency affect Social Agency, and in the process highlight outstanding empirical questions within the field. Finally, concepts from wider research areas are discussed in relation to the ecological validity of Social Agency paradigms, and we provide recommendations for future methodology.

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Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 70%

Section: Social Agency With Artificial Agentsmentioning

confidence: 75%

Social Agency as a continuum

et al. 2020

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“…Finally, studies have shown that contextual features of an interaction can influence the extent of mind perception. For example, when the outcome of an interaction is negative, people attribute more mental capacities to robots [35], and focusing on the body rather than the face of another agent changes the dynamic of mind perception such that it reduces perceptions of the agency component of mind perception (i.e., planning, acting) but increases perceptions of the experience component (i.e., emotion, sensation [36]).…”

Section: Causes and Effects Of Mind Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does context matter? Effects of robot appearance and reliability on social attention differs based on lifelikeness of gaze task

Abubshait¹,

Weis²,

Wiese³

2020

Preprint

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Social signals, such as changes in gaze direction, are essential cues to predict others’ mental states and behaviors (i.e., mentalizing). Studies show that humans can mentalize with non-human agents when they perceive a mind in them (i.e., mind perception). Robots that physically and/or behaviorally resemble humans likely trigger mind perception, which enhances the relevance of social cues and improves social-cognitive performance. The current ex-periments examine whether the effect of physical and behavioral influencers of mind perception on social-cognitive processing is modulated by the lifelikeness of a social interaction. Participants interacted with robots of varying degrees of physical (humanlike vs. robot-like) and behavioral (reliable vs. random) human-likeness while the lifelikeness of a social attention task was manipulated across five experiments. The first four experiments manipulated lifelikeness via the physical realism of the robot images (Study 1 and 2), the biological plausibility of the social signals (Study 3), and the plausibility of the social con-text (Study 4). They showed that humanlike behavior affected social attention whereas appearance affected mind perception ratings. However, when the lifelikeness of the interaction was increased by using videos of a human and a robot sending the social cues in a realistic environment (Study 5), social attention mechanisms were affected both by physical appearance and behavioral features, while mind perception ratings were mainly affected by physical appearance. This indicates that in order to understand the effect of physical and behavioral features on social cognition, paradigms should be used that adequately simulate the lifelikeness of social interactions.

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“…Adopting the intentional stance toward robots can also have positive effects on human performance in HRI as they can facilitate learning (Brown and Howard, 2013), improve physical interactions where handeye coordination is needed (Carter et al, 2014), induce social facilitation effects (Bartneck, 2003;Woods et al, 2005;Looije et al, 2010), and improve interactions in team settings (Breazeal et al, 2005). By the same token, not adopting the intentional stance toward social robots can pose a problem for HRI, as humans might be engaging fewer socio-cognitive mechanisms in social interactions with robots, and thereby less social attunement (i.e., activation of socio-cognitive mechanisms) occurs between the two agents (Wiese et al, 2012(Wiese et al, , 2018Wykowska et al, 2014;Özdem et al, 2016;Caruana et al, 2017;Ciardo et al, 2020; for a review, see Perez-Osorio et al, 2015;Wiese et al, 2017;Schellen and Wykowska, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Repetitive Robot Behavior Impacts Perception of Intentionality and Gaze-Related Attentional Orienting

Abubshait

Wykowska

2020

Front. Robot. AI

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Gaze behavior is an important social signal between humans as it communicates locations of interest. People typically orient their attention to where others look as this informs about others' intentions and future actions. Studies have shown that humans can engage in similar gaze behavior with robots but presumably more so when they adopt the intentional stance toward them (i.e., believing robot behaviors are intentional). In laboratory settings, the phenomenon of attending toward the direction of others' gaze has been examined with the use of the gaze-cueing paradigm. While the gaze-cueing paradigm has been successful in investigating the relationship between adopting the intentional stance toward robots and attention orienting to gaze cues, it is unclear if the repetitiveness of the gaze-cueing paradigm influences adopting the intentional stance. Here, we examined if the duration of exposure to repetitive robot gaze behavior in a gaze-cueing task has a negative impact on subjective attribution of intentionality. Participants performed a short, medium, or long face-to-face gaze-cueing paradigm with an embodied robot while subjective ratings were collected pre and post the interaction. Results show that participants in the long exposure condition had the smallest change in their intention attribution scores, if any, while those in the short exposure condition had a positive change in their intention attribution, indicating that participants attributed more intention to the robot after short interactions. The results also show that attention orienting to robot gaze-cues was positively related to how much intention was attributed to the robot, but this relationship became more negative as the length of exposure increased. In contrast to subjective ratings, the gaze-cueing effects (GCEs) increased as a function of the duration of exposure to repetitive behavior. The data suggest a tradeoff between the desired number of trials needed for observing various mechanisms of social cognition, such as GCEs, and the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance toward a robot.

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Attribution of intentional agency towards robots reduces one’s own sense of agency

Cited by 55 publications

References 33 publications

Social Agency as a continuum

Social Agency as a continuum

Does context matter? Effects of robot appearance and reliability on social attention differs based on lifelikeness of gaze task

Repetitive Robot Behavior Impacts Perception of Intentionality and Gaze-Related Attentional Orienting

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