Auditors’ response to corporate fraud: evidence from audit fees and auditor turnover

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to examine how auditors respond to the revelation of clients’ corporate fraud. Design/methodology/approach This study uses an ordinary least squares estimation to examine how audit fees and audit turnover change after the revelation of corporate fraud. Findings After a client discloses fraudulent activities, average audit fees significantly increase due to an increase in audit hours, rather than in audit premiums. Both new and continuing auditors increase audit hours for fraud firms, but only new auditors charge higher audit fees for the increased effort. In addition, when auditors are designated by regulators following the revelation of fraud, audit fees and premiums increase, but audit hours do not. Finally, auditor turnover becomes more frequent after the revelation of fraud. Overall, the findings suggest that auditors update their assessment of audit risks after fraud revelation and, thus, adjust their audit pricing and client acceptance decisions. Practical implications The study provides regulators and audit practitioners with insights into how to audit contract characteristics and regulatory intervention (auditor designations) affect auditors’ response to increased audit risks. Originality/value The study contributes to the auditing literature and practice by providing evidence on how auditors respond to the revelation of fraudulent activities and how their response depends on their ability to determine audit fees. Moreover, we provide novel evidence that audit contracting characteristics and regulatory requirements result in different responses of auditors toward changes in audit risks.

Are female CFOs more ethical to the occurrences of financial reporting fraud? Theoretical and empirical evidence from cross-listed firms in the US

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Keyakinan Hukum Karma Memoderasi Pengaruh Hedonisme Pada Kecurangan Dalam Pelaporan Keuangan

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Türki̇ye’deki̇ Bağimsiz Deneti̇m Ücretleri̇ne İli̇şki̇n İlk Bulgular: Bi̇st-100 Şi̇rketleri̇nde Bi̇r Araştirma

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