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Purpose This study aims to examine how auditors respond to the revelation of clients’ corporate fraud. Design/methodology/approach This study uses an ordinary least squares estimation to examine how audit fees and audit turnover change after the revelation of corporate fraud. Findings After a client discloses fraudulent activities, average audit fees significantly increase due to an increase in audit hours, rather than in audit premiums. Both new and continuing auditors increase audit hours for fraud firms, but only new auditors charge higher audit fees for the increased effort. In addition, when auditors are designated by regulators following the revelation of fraud, audit fees and premiums increase, but audit hours do not. Finally, auditor turnover becomes more frequent after the revelation of fraud. Overall, the findings suggest that auditors update their assessment of audit risks after fraud revelation and, thus, adjust their audit pricing and client acceptance decisions. Practical implications The study provides regulators and audit practitioners with insights into how to audit contract characteristics and regulatory intervention (auditor designations) affect auditors’ response to increased audit risks. Originality/value The study contributes to the auditing literature and practice by providing evidence on how auditors respond to the revelation of fraudulent activities and how their response depends on their ability to determine audit fees. Moreover, we provide novel evidence that audit contracting characteristics and regulatory requirements result in different responses of auditors toward changes in audit risks.

Purpose Despite the importance of research and development (R&D), information on its value is not readily available to managers. This study aims to explore the role of common auditors, who audit multiple peer firms in the product market, in clients’ R&D investment decisions. This study highlights common auditors as information intermediaries who affect corporate R&D investment, focusing on the importance of knowledge resources in R&D investment and the limited ability of peers’ public information to communicate the value of R&D. Design/methodology/approach This study employs pairwise data of firm-peer-year observations to identify a common auditor who provides audit services to the focal firm and its peer firm. This study examines how a firm’s R&D investment changes when the firm’s incumbent auditor provides audit services to peers and analyzes various factors that moderate the effect of common auditors. Findings Peer firms audited by the same auditor make similar R&D investment decisions. This effect is more pronounced when the auditor specializes more in auditing R&D, when the auditor has a long-term client relationship, and when the firms exhibit a higher level of demand for incremental information relevant to R&D investment. Consistent with the beneficial role of common auditors, firms that are more responsive to auditor-provided information engage more actively in innovation activities in subsequent years. Originality/value This study deepens the understanding of how networks created by common auditors facilitate information flow among client firms and shape these firms’ R&D investment decisions.

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