Austrian economics without extreme apriorism: construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic

Abstract

Current debates between behavioural and orthodox economists indicate that the role and epistemological status of first principles is a particularly pressing problem in economics. As an alleged paragon of extreme apriorism, the methodology of Austrian economics in Mises' tradition is often dismissed as untenable in the light of modern philosophy. In particular, the defence of the so-called fundamental axiom of praxeology-"Man acts."-by means of pure intuition is almost unanimously rejected. However, in recently resurfacing debates, the extremeness of Mises' epistemological position has been called into question. Rather than directly engaging in these exegetical discussions, this paper aims to substantiate the possibility and plausibility of conventionalist defences of praxeology per se. The proposed shift includes settling for an analytic fundamental axiom and acknowledging the prima facie tenability of other research programs than praxeology. Since conventionalist praxeology is only moderately aprioristic, mainstream economists and philosophers might be more likely to engage in fruitful discussions with those Austrian scholars who elaborate pragmatic arguments for praxeology instead of invoking pure intuition.

Revisiting the criticisms of rational choice theories

“…However, RCT have also been attributed the status of a first principle or a postulate that has the function of allowing for the deduction of major theorems in economics (Kirchgässner, 2008; Vanberg, 2004). Advocates of the Austrian school, for example, have taken this principle to be a fundamental axiom laying the conceptual ground of the field of what they call 'praxeology' (for a discussion, see Linsbichler, 2021). More generally, we can distinguish between an internalist view and an externalist view to think about the status of RCT.…”

Philosophy of Austrian Economics – Extended Cut

“…Consequently, its ultimate aim is not the explication of expedient terminological conventions but the discovery and establishment of allegedly unique, correct concepts such as the concept of action. Like the Hamburger Deutung, Linsbichler (2017Linsbichler ( , 2021c proposes to construe the a priori parts of Austrian economics as analytic instead of synthetic but he advocates conventionalism regarding the "ultra-refined grammar" (Hutchison 1998, p. 68) of economics and other linguistic rules. 29 8 Realism, Essentialism, and All That Labels that are often attributed and self-attributed to Austrian economics are "realism", "anti-instrumentalism", "realisticness", and "essentialism".…”

“…More recently,Blaug (1992Blaug ( /2006 concurs by declaring ontological individualism to be "trivially true" but denies any necessary implication for methodology.26 See e.g Caldwell 2009;Linsbichler 2017Linsbichler , 2021cScheall 2015bScheall , 2017aTokumaru 2018;Zanotti & Cachanosky 2015. …”

Viennese Late Enlightenment and the Early Socialist Calculation Debates: Rationalities and Their Limits

“… See Scheall (2017) andLinsbichler (2021a) for perhaps even stronger tensions in Mises's epistemology.Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3904011…”