Authenticated Key Exchange Provably Secure Against the Man-in-the-Middle Attack

Johnston, Anna M.; Gemmell, Peter

doi:10.1007/s00145-001-0017-4

Cited by 21 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Blake-Wilson, Johnson, and Menezes (1997) surveyed a variety of key agreement protocols, and Blake- Wilson and Menezes (1999) and Johnston and Gemmell (2002) analyzed authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols.…”

Section: Background and Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chaum's protocol for detecting man-in-the-middle: Explanation, demonstration, and timing studies for a text-messaging scenario

Sherman¹,

Seymour²,

Kore³

et al. 2016

Cryptologia

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This article explains, demonstrates, and evaluates Chaum's protocol for detecting a man-in-the-middle (MitM) of textmessaging network communications. MitM attacks pose serious risks to many network communications. Networks often mitigate these risks with robust protocols, such as TLS, which assume some type of public-key infrastructure that provides a mechanism for the authenticated exchange of public keys. By contrast, Chaum's protocol aims to detect a MitM with minimal assumptions and technology, and in particular without assuming the authenticated exchange of public keys. Chaum assumes that the eavesdropper can "sound like" the communicants but that the eavesdropper cannot fabricate sensible conversations.

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Section: Background and Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Chaum's protocol for detecting man-in-the-middle: Explanation, demonstration, and timing studies for a text-messaging scenario

Sherman¹,

Seymour²,

Kore³

et al. 2016

Cryptologia

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“…In 7] an authenticated key exchange based on the difficulty of the q th root problem was described. In [8] a new three pass key agreement protocol with key confirmation is proposed.…”

Section: Necessity Of Authenticated Key Exchange Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Key Exchange Protocol in Elliptic Curve Cryptography with No Public Point

Kaabneh¹,

Al-Bdour²

2005

American J. of Applied Sciences

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Abstract:In recent years some cryptographic algorithms have gained popularity due to properties that make them suitable for use in constrained environment like mobile information appliances, where computing resources and power availability are limited. One of these cryptosystems is Elliptic curve which requires less computational power, memory and communication bandwidth compared to other cryptosystem. This makes the elliptic curve cryptography to gain wide acceptance as an alternative to conventional cryptosystems (DSA, RSA, AES, etc.). All existing protocols for elliptic curve cryptosystems that are used for either key exchange or for ciphering, assume that the curve E, the field F q and a point P on the curve are all public. In this research we propose a modified protocol for elliptic curve key exchange based on elliptic curve over rings, assuming that only the curve E and F q are public, keeping the base point P secret, which make attacking the cryptosystem harder by the eavesdropper. Also we provide imbedded authentication, so our protocol does not suffer from the man in the middle attack.

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“…Cipolla [3] used the fact that q n+1 |(P q − 1) along with properties of the norm of elements in F P q to design a square root algorithm (q = 2) over F P . This algorithm is easily extended to compute qth roots for any prime q [1] and avoids the generally required discrete logarithm computation for n > 1 [2,4].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trace formulae for irreducible polynomials over FP with minimal order roots in FPq

Johnston

2008

Finite Fields and Their Applications

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The extension field F P q where q is a prime divisor of (P −1), has a unique structure. This paper describes this unique structure and uses it to derive formulas relating the trace values for elements in F P q . These formulas can be refined for certain elements to produce a formula for the trace. BackgroundWhen q is a prime divisor of (P − 1), the extension field F P q has a unique structure. This structure is based on the factorization of (P q − 1) with respect to (P − 1) and q.Let q be a prime withwhere n 1, and gcd(q, s) = 1. Cipolla [3] used the fact that q n+1 |(P q − 1) along with properties of the norm of elements in F P q to design a square root algorithm (q = 2) over F P . This algorithm is easily extended to compute qth roots for any prime q [1] and avoids the generally required discrete logarithm computation for n > 1 [2,4].

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Authenticated Key Exchange Provably Secure Against the Man-in-the-Middle Attack

Cited by 21 publications

References 8 publications

Chaum's protocol for detecting man-in-the-middle: Explanation, demonstration, and timing studies for a text-messaging scenario

Chaum's protocol for detecting man-in-the-middle: Explanation, demonstration, and timing studies for a text-messaging scenario

Key Exchange Protocol in Elliptic Curve Cryptography with No Public Point

Trace formulae for irreducible polynomials over FP with minimal order roots in FPq

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