Authoritarian Resilience and International Linkages in Iran and Syria

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan; Hinnebusch, Raymond; Huuhtanen, Heidi; Raunio, Paola; Warnaar, Maaike; Zintl, Tina

doi:10.2307/j.ctvqsds1z.14

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Unlike repression, coercive state actors do not intend to eradicate organizations as they lack large-scale mobilization capacity. Coercion is politically costly, and in the long run it requires mobilizing significant financial and human resources (Ehteshami et al 2013; Koesel 2014). Autocrats would not coerce groups with irreconcilable interests and a strong capacity to mobilize.…”

Section: How Autocrats Control Societal Organizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocracies and the Control of Societal Organizations

Reny

2019

Gov. & oppos.

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Authoritarian regimes seek to prevent formal and informal organizations in society from engaging in mobilized dissent. What strategies do they use to do so, and what explains their choices? I posit that state actors in autocracies use four mechanisms to control societal organizations: repression, coercion, cooptation and containment. How they control these organizations depends on whether they think they might undermine political stability. Two factors inform that assessment. First is whether state actors think societal organizations’ interests are reconcilable with regime resilience. Second is whether groups are in national or international networks that are either cohesive or incohesive. While the irreconcilability of interests influences state actors’ perceptions of groups as subversive, network cohesion shapes organizations’ capacity for large-scale mobilization.

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Section: How Autocrats Control Societal Organizationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Autocracies and the Control of Societal Organizations

Reny

2019

Gov. & oppos.

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“…9 For one example, see Nafi 2017. 12 Ehteshami et al 2013. counter-containment, the fundamental basis of the relationship is first and foremost deterrence; this can explain Iranian actions throughout the course of the Syrian war. Syria offers Iran vital strategic depth in the Arab world, allowing it manoeuvrability throughout the Levant, and provides it with a gateway to Hezbollah, enhancing Iranian deterrence of Israel.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Iran’s Syria Strategy: The Evolution of Deterrence

Ahmadian¹,

Mohseni

2020

Nl Arms

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Iran has been a critical player in the Syrian war since 2011, crafting a complex foreign policy and military strategy to preserve its Syrian ally. What have been the drivers of Iranian decision-making in this conflict? And how has Iranian strategy evolved over the course of the war? This chapter argues that the logic of deterrence has been fundamental not just for shaping the contours of Iran–Syria relations since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but also for determining the overall trajectory of Iranian strategy in the Syrian war. The authors outline Iran’s decision-making calculus and divide the country’s strategy on Syria after the Arab Spring into four primary phases: (1) a ‘Basij’ strategy to establish local militias in Syria; (2) a regionalization strategy to incorporate transnational fighters and militias in the war effort; (3) an internationalization strategy to incorporate Russia and balance the United States; and (4) a post-ISIS deterrence strategy to balance against the United States, Turkey and Israel. Iran’s Syria strategy progressively escalated in response to the possible defeat of its ally and the deterioration of its forward deterrence capacities against the United States and Israel. Today, the potential for direct inter-state conflict is rising as proxy warfare declines and Iran attempts to maintain the credibility of its forward deterrence.

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“…The articles discuss the changing security environment in the Middle East region and analyses the role of Iran, Israel and Turkey as significant foreign policy and security actors in the Middle East. Located in geographical proximity to Iraq and Syria they are affected by the ongoing crisis there, at the same time as they in different ways contribute to the regional development (Aran, 2012;Phillips, 2012;Ehteshami et al, 2013). Related to the complex role of the non-Arab states in the region, a number of important non-state actors are also influencing the recent turmoil in the Middle East.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysing security subcomplexes in a changing Middle East—the role of non-Arab state actors and non-state actors

Seeberg

2016

Palgrave Commun

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This article presents a theoretical framework for a collection of articles ("special issue"), which aims at discussing the role of non-Arab state actors and non-state actors in a changing Middle East. The articles in the collection offer perspectives that have been overlooked in recent research, namely those focusing on the role of non-Arab state actors and non-state actors in connection with the changing security environment in the region. Furthermore, these articles discuss how changes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are appearing in different and shifting contexts in the creation of new local, sub-regional, or regional security subcomplexes in which Arab states, non-Arab states and non-state actors enter into new conflicts, alliances and other political relations with and against each other. The role of international actors interfering in the region is also analyzed in the context of the changing Middle East.

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Authoritarian Resilience and International Linkages in Iran and Syria

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Autocracies and the Control of Societal Organizations

Autocracies and the Control of Societal Organizations

Iran’s Syria Strategy: The Evolution of Deterrence

Analysing security subcomplexes in a changing Middle East—the role of non-Arab state actors and non-state actors

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