Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy

Albertus, Michael; Menaldo, Victor

doi:10.1017/9781108185950

Cited by 81 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 169 publications

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“…141 To measure coercive capacity we follow Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo and use the size of the military, measured as the share of the total population belonging to the armed forces. 142 To measure political control over the military, we use two indicators. The first is the partymilit variable given by Geddes,Wright,and Frantz.…”

Section: Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability

Lachapelle¹,

Levitsky²,

Way³

et al. 2020

World Pol.

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This article explores the causes of authoritarian durability. Why do some authoritarian regimes survive for decades, often despite severe crises, while others collapse quickly, even absent significant challenges? Based on an analysis of all authoritarian regimes between 1900 and 2015, the authors argue that regimes founded in violent social revolution are especially durable. Revolutionary regimes, such as those in Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam, endured for more than half a century in the face of strong external pressure, poor economic performance, and large-scale policy failures. The authors develop and test a theory that accounts for such durability using a novel data set of revolutionary regimes since 1900. The authors contend that autocracies that emerge out of violent social revolution tend to confront extraordinary military threats, which lead to the development of cohesive ruling parties and powerful and loyal security apparatuses, as well as to the destruction of alternative power centers. These characteristics account for revolutionary regimes’ unusual longevity.

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Section: Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability

Lachapelle¹,

Levitsky²,

Way³

et al. 2020

World Pol.

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show abstract

“…Revisions of the distributive conflict approach have concentrated in discussing the causes of elite support of democratization in contexts of high inequality (Albertus, 2015; Albertus & Gay, 2017; Ansell & Samuels, 2014), but have generally not addressed why elites remain loyal to democracy afterward (exceptions are Albertus & Menaldo 2018; Dunning, 2008; Ziblatt, 2017). A criticism often made to the distributive conflict approach relates to its strong assumptions of rationality, which often contrast with observed outcomes (Weyland, 2019).…”

Section: High Inequality and Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some revisions of the distributive conflict approach highlight the effect of other variables beyond inequality in order to explain elites’ commitment to democratic rule, such as the abundance of natural resources (Dunning, 2008), the strength of conservative parties (Ziblatt, 2017), and the participation of ousting autocrats in the elaboration of the constitutional rules of the emerging democracies (Albertus & Menaldo, 2018). Authors portray the advantages of democracy for elites in securing assets from, not the poor, but the state (Albertus, 2015; Albertus & Gay, 2017; Ansell & Samuels, 2014), while others assert that distributive conflict has little impact on elites’ decision-making process during transitions (Haggard & Kaufman, 2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

State Segmentation and Democratic Survival in Latin America

López

2020

American Behavioral Scientist

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Popular models portray that high inequality induces elites to sponsor coups and reverse democratization as a means for repressing redistributive demands. Challenging this prediction, Latin America shifted from a historical pattern of systematic democratic breakdowns to one characterized by the resilience of democracy despite extreme levels of inequality. This article argues that the reminiscence of state-led repression under democracy explains why elites more regularly waive coups as solutions to distributive conflict in Latin American democracies. I call this state segmentation, a concept that describes the asymmetries between the enforcement of citizenship rights for those in privileged positions and for the poor. Wherever state segmentation is high, the odds of democratic breakdown should be lower. I test the argument using logistic regression models to predict the probability of coups and mandate interruptions considering different levels of state segmentation in Latin America using V-Dem data. Results show that asymmetries in access to citizenship rights indeed prevent democratic breakdowns.

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“…Such events were probably di cult to anticipate at the time the constitution was drafted in 1980. As many commentators have highlighted, though, the political system resulting from the democratic transition was highly satisfactory to the military government (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006;Londregan, 2007;Albertus and Menaldo, 2018).…”

Section: The 1988 Plebiscitementioning

confidence: 99%

The Geography of Repression and Support for Democracy: Evidence From the Pinochet Dictatorship

et al. 2018

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We show that exposure to repression under dictatorship increases support for democracy and contributes to regime change when a democratic window of opportunity arises. Studying the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile, we exploit the fact that the predetermined location of military bases predicts local levels of civilian victimization, but is unrelated to historical political preferences. Using two-stage least squares, we show that increased exposure to repression during the dictatorship led to higher voter registration and higher opposition to Pinochet's continuation in power in the 1988 plebiscite that triggered the democratic transition. Complementary survey data confirms that individuals with greater exposure to repression during the military regime continue to have stronger preferences for democracy. However, exposure to repression does not a↵ect election outcomes after democratization.

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Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy

Cited by 81 publications

References 169 publications

Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability

Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability

State Segmentation and Democratic Survival in Latin America

The Geography of Repression and Support for Democracy: Evidence From the Pinochet Dictatorship

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