Authoritarianism, Democracy, Islamic Movements and Contestations of Islamic Religious Ideas in Indonesia

Abstract

Since independence, Islamic civil society groups and intellectuals have played a vital role in Indonesian politics. This paper seeks to chart the contestation of Islamic religious ideas in Indonesian politics and society throughout the 20th Century, from the declaration of independence in 1945 up until 2001. This paper discusses the social and political influence of, and relationships between, three major Indonesian Islamic intellectual streams: Modernists, Traditionalists, and neo-Modernists. It describes the intellectual roots of each of these Islamic movements, their relationships with the civil Islamic groups Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), their influence upon Indonesian politics, and their interactions with the state. The paper examines the ways in which mainstream Islamic politics in Indonesia, the world’s largest majority Muslim nation, has been shaped by disagreements between modernists and traditionalists, beginning in the early 1950s. Disagreements resulted in a schism within Masyumi, the dominant Islamic party, that saw the traditionalists affiliated with NU leave to establish a separate NU party. Not only did this prevent Masyumi from coming close to garnering a majority of the votes in the 1955 election, but it also contributed to Masyumi veering into Islamism. This conservative turn coincided with elite contestation to define Indonesia as an Islamic state and was a factor in the party antagonizing President Sukarno to the point that he moved to ban it. The banning of Masyumi came as Sukarno imposed ‘guided democracy’ as a soft-authoritarian alternative to democracy and set in train dynamics that facilitated the emergence of military-backed authoritarianism under Suharto. During the four decades in which democracy was suppressed in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and associated NGOs, activists, and intellectuals were the backbones of civil society. They provided critical support for the non-sectarian principles at the heart of the Indonesian constitution, known as Pancasila. This found the strongest and clearest articulation in the neo-Modernist movement that emerged in the 1980s and synthesized key elements of traditionalist Islamic scholarship and Modernist reformism. Neo-Modernism, which was articulated by leading Islamic intellectual Nurcholish Madjid and Nahdlatul Ulama Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid, presents an open, inclusive, progressive understanding of Islam that is affirming of social pluralism, comfortable with modernity, and stresses the need for tolerance and harmony in inter-communal relations. Its articulation by Wahid, who later became president of Indonesia, contributed to Indonesia’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The vital contribution of neo-Modernist Islam to democracy and reform in Indonesia serves to refute the notion that Islam is incompatible with democracy and pluralism.

Relation of religion and practical politics: Contextual adoption of constitutional Islamic jurisprudence for Muslim clerics in Indonesia

“…Furthermore, from the perspective of political motivation, political relations are built by pesantren ulama for dual roles as pesantren clerics as well as acting as politicians (Abidin & Dong 2020;Barton, Yilmaz & Morieson 2021;Mietzner & Muhtadi 2020;Pribadi 2014;Rokhmad & Susilo 2017;Suradi & Surahman 2020). The justification is based on the scientific basis of fiqh that they have mastered.…”

Examining Teaching Materials in Higher Education Against Religious Intolerance and Pluralism in the Global Era: Islamic Perspective

“…7/Munas VII/MUI/11/2005 dated July 29, 2005, stated that MUI forbids religious pluralism and forbids Muslims from adopting pluralism. Other studies differ and state that the vital contribution of neo-Modernist Islam refutes the notion that Islam is incompatible with pluralism (Barton et al, 2021). In developed countries such as France, the question is where religious pluralism is going because of the government regulation in the 2004 law regarding the prohibition of religious symbols seen in educational institutions (Barras, 2013).…”

Political Mobilisation of Religious, Chauvinist, and Technocratic Populists in Indonesia and Their Activities in Cyberspace

“…The group has opted for forceful Salafist ideology implementation, seeking its roots in Saudi Islamist theology (Barton 2021). Similar to other Islamist civilisationists Shakil and Yilmaz 2021), this radical activist religious populism divided 'the pious' ummah and demonised all who did not adhere to its strict codes; this ideology was propagated through its dakwah centres and social welfare activities along with its notorious militia (Barton 2021; Barton et al 2021aBarton et al , 2021bBarton et al , 2021cYilmaz and Barton 2021a). Exploiting a sense of being 'left behind' by the state and its policies, FPI provided its followers with a victimhood identity and agency to 'get back' and 'reform' society with its vigilantism (Barton 2021;Barton et al 2021b): "The FPI demonstrates the manner in which smaller, liminal, political actors can instrumentalise religion and leverage religious rhetoric to reshape political discourse, and in doing so, drive demand for religious populism" (Barton et al 2021b).…”